Review of Economic Theories of Regulation by Johan den Hertog
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute  
 
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 
Utrecht School of Economics 
Utrecht University 
 
Janskerkhof 12   
3512 BL Utrecht 
The Netherlands 
telephone   +31 30 253 9800 
fax     +31 30 253 7373 
website   www.koopmansinstitute.uu.nl 
   
The Tjalling C. Koopmans Institute is the research institute 
and research school of Utrecht School of Economics.  
It was founded in 2003, and named after Professor Tjalling C. 
Koopmans, Dutch-born Nobel Prize laureate in economics of 
1975.  
 
In the discussion papers series the Koopmans Institute 
publishes results of ongoing research for early dissemination 
of research results, and to enhance discussion with colleagues.  
 
Please send any comments and suggestions on the Koopmans 






How to reach the authors 
  
Please direct all correspondence to the first author.  
 
 
Johan den Hertog 
Utrecht University 
Utrecht School of Economics 
Janskerkhof 12 
3512 BL Utrecht 
The Netherlands.  




This paper can be downloaded at: http:// 
www.uu.nl/rebo/economie/discussionpapers Utrecht School of Economics 
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 









Johan den Hertog 
 
 
Utrecht School of Economics 






This paper reviews the economic theories of regulation. It discusses the public 
and private interest theories of regulation, as the criticisms that have been leveled 
at them. The extent to which these theories are also able to account for privatization 
and deregulation is evaluated and policies involving re-regulation are discussed. The 
paper thus reviews rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation, yardstick 
regulation, interconnection and access regulation, and franchising or bidding 
processes. The primary aim of those instruments is to improve the operating 
efficiency of the regulated firms. Huge investments will be needed in the regulated 
network sectors. The question is brought up if regulatory instruments and 
institutions primarily designed to improve operating efficiency are equally well-
placed to promote the necessary investments and to balance the resulting conflicting 
interests between for example consumers and investors. 
 
 
Keywords: Regulation, Deregulation, Public Interest Theories, Private Interest 
Theories, Interest Groups, Public Choice, Market Failures, Price-cap Regulation, Rate 
of Return Regulation, Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding, Access Regulation. 
 
 
JEL classification: D72, D78, H10, K20 
 
   2 
1. Introduction 
 
There are two broad traditions with respect to the economic theories of regulation. The first 
tradition assumes that regulators have sufficient information and enforcement powers to 
effectively promote the public interest. This tradition also assumes that regulators are 
benevolent and aim to pursue the public interest. Economic theories that proceed from these 
assumptions are therefore often called ‘public interest theories of regulation’. Another 
tradition in the economic studies of regulation proceeds from different assumptions. 
Regulators do not have sufficient information with respect to cost, demand, quality and other 
dimensions of firm behavior. They can therefore only imperfectly, if at all, promote the public 
interest when controlling firms or societal activities. Within this tradition, these information, 
monitoring and enforcement cost also apply to other economic agents, such as legislators, 
voters or consumers. And, more importantly, it is generally assumed that all economic agents 
pursue their own interest, which may or may not include elements of the public interest. 
Under these assumptions there is no reason to conclude that regulation will promote the 
public interest. The differences in objectives of economic agents and the costs involved in the 
interaction between them may effectively make it possible for some of the agents to pursue 
their own interests, perhaps at the cost of the public interest. Economic theories that proceed 
from these latter assumptions are therefore often called ‘private interest theories of 
regulation’.  
 
Fundamental to public interest theories are market failures and efficient government 
intervention. According to these theories, regulation increases social welfare. Private interest 
theories explain regulation from interest group behavior. Transfers of wealth to the more 
effective interest groups often also decrease social welfare. Interest groups can be firms, 
consumers or consumer groups, regulators or their staff, legislators, unions and more. The 
private interest theories of regulation therefore overlap with a number of theories in the field 
of public choice and thus turn effectively into theories of political actions. Depending on the 
efficiency of the political process, social welfare either increases or decreases. The first part 
of this paper discusses the general public and private interest theories of regulation, as the 
criticisms that have been leveled at them.  
 
Important changes have taken place in the regulation of fundamental sectors of the economy 
such as electricity and gas, electronic communications, water and sewerage, postal services 
and transport (airports and airlines, railways, busses). The services provided by the sectors are 
often essential for both businesses and consumers. Interruption in the supply of these services 
will put a halt to economic activities, bring a stop to interactions taking place in society at 
large and these interruptions may thus present risks to life and health. For those and other 
reasons these industries have in the past either been regulated, as for example in the US or 
they have been organized under the control of the state in the form of state-owned enterprises, 
as for example in the European Union. The privatization of these enterprises necessitated 
other forms of control, particularly for those network parts of the privatized firm where 
competition is not expected to be effective. And amongst other reasons, the type of regulation 
developed for those networks proved to be an impetus for regulatory reform of the traditional 
type of regulating US-companies. The second part of this paper reviews the general economic 
theories on these instruments of regulation as well as some of their alternatives or additions 
that have been suggested in the economic literature or put into effect in practice. This paper 
thus discusses rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation, and 
franchising or bidding processes. The former state-owned enterprises were often integrated 
firms who provided the production, distribution and sale of for example electricity or   3 
telecommunication services. The perception was that in some of these stages competition 
could be introduced because these stages were thought to be inherently competitive. Examples 
are the production and sale of electricity or gas and the provision and sale of internet and 
telephone services. Furthermore, depending on cost and demand developments, the hope was 
that in the future it might even be possible to have several networks, for example 
telecommunication networks, competing among each other. Competition would thus replace 
regulation or other types of governance of network sectors. The wish to introduce competition 
in the short run and in the long run required restructuring and separation of those companies, 
preferably before or perhaps after privatization. But if the networks are separated from the 
other stages of providing services or if several networks are allowed to compete in practice, it 
has to be possible to access the network or to interconnect them, if several networks are put in 
place. Since it might not be in the interest of the privatized firm to allow competitors on the 
network to provide competing services downstream, access regulation has to be put in place. 
Furthermore, if it is foreseen that several networks will be able to efficiently service the 
market, these networks have to interconnect, for example when a caller on an originating 
network wants to reach somebody on a different, terminating network. This requires 
interconnection regulation, again because it might not be in the interest of the incumbent firm 
to efficiently interconnect other and competing networks. Particularly, regulators have 
difficult tradeoffs to make in the transition stage from a dominant firm market toward the 
development of a competitive market. Should regulators actively facilitate potential 
competitors to enter the market, and if so, how. The difficulties involved in these types of 
regulations are discussed. Some final comments will conclude this paper. 
 
 
2. General Economic Theories of Regulation  
 
In legal and economic literature, there is no fixed definition of the term ‘regulation’. Some 
researchers consider and evaluate various definitions and attempt through systematization to 
make the term amenable to further analysis (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Morgan and Yeung, 
2007; Ogus, 2004). Others almost entirely abstain from an exact definition of regulation 
(Ekelund, 1998; Joskow and Noll, 1981; Spulber, 1989; Train, 1997). In order to delineate the 
subject and because of the limited space, a further definition of regulation is nevertheless 
necessary. In this article, regulation will be taken to mean the employment of legal 
instruments for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives. A characteristic of 
legal instruments is that individuals or organizations can be compelled by government to 
comply with prescribed behavior under penalty of sanctions. Corporations can be forced, for 
example, to observe certain prices, to supply certain goods, to stay out of certain markets, to 
apply particular techniques in the production process or to pay the legal minimum wage. 
Sanctions can include fines, the publicizing of violations, imprisonment, an order to make 
specific arrangements, an injunction against withholding certain actions, divestiture of 
businesses or closing down the business. 
 
A distinction is often made between economic and social regulation, for example Viscusi, 
Vernon and Harrington (2005). Two types of economic regulations can be distinguished: 
structural regulation and conduct regulation (Kay and Vickers, 1990). Structural regulation 
concerns the regulation of the market structure. Examples are restrictions on entry or exit, and 
rules mandating firms not to supply professional services in the absence of a recognized 
qualification. Conduct regulation is used to regulate the behavior of producers and consumers 
in the market. Examples are price controls, the requirement to provide in all demand, the 
labeling of products, rules against advertising and minimum quality standards. Economic   4 
regulation is mainly exercised on so-called natural monopolies and market structures with 
imperfect or excessive competition. The aim is to counter the negative welfare effects of 
dominant firm behavior and to stabilize market processes. Social regulation comprises 
regulation in the area of the environment, occupational health and safety, consumer protection 
and labor (equal opportunities and so on). Instruments applied here include regulations 
dealing with the discharge of environmentally harmful substances, safety regulations in 
factories and workplaces, the obligation to include information on the packaging of goods or 
on labels, the prohibition of the supply of certain goods or services unless in the possession of 
a permit and banning discrimination on race, skin color, religion, sex, or nationality in the 
recruitment of personnel. 
 
The economic literature distinguishes between positive and normative economic theories of 
regulation. The positive variant aims to provide economic explanations of regulation and to 
provide an effect-analysis of regulation. The normative variant investigates which type of 
regulation is the most efficient or optimal. The latter variant is called normative because there 
is usually an implicit assumption that efficient regulation would also be desirable; for the 
distinction between positive and normative theories, see the discussion between Blaug (1993) 
and Hennipman (1992). This article will concentrate on general explanatory and predictive 
economic theories of regulation. In this respect two preliminary remarks are in order. First, 
the mainstream economic literature is implicitly or explicitly critical of the public interest 
theories of regulation. These theories are often thought to be ‘normative theories as positive 
analysis’ (Joskow and Noll, 1981), implying that the evaluative theoretical and empirical 
analysis of markets has been used to explain actual regulatory institutions in practice. The 
public interests theories of regulation are described as rationalizing existing regulations, while 
private interest theories are discussed as theories that explain existing regulation (for example 
Ogus, 2004). According to some other authors, there even is no such thing as public interest 
theories of regulation or they are a misinterpretation and have lost validity (Hantke-Domas, 
2003; Häg, 1997). To have a proper discussion on the evaluation and appraisal of economic 
theories of regulation, it would be desirable to explicitly proceed from evaluation criteria that 
have been developed and are subject of debate in the methodological literature on the 
appraisal of theories (Dow, 2002; Blaug, 1992). Some of these criteria would be for example 
internal consistency, empirical corroboration, plausibility and more. By making the evaluation 
criteria explicit, the appraisal of economic theories of regulation would become more precise 
and explicit. The second remark pertains to the concept of regulation. A distinction is often 
made between legislation and regulation. Usually  in legislation regulatory powers are 
allocated to lower level institutions or officials. The result of the use of that power by these 
officials or institutions is then called regulation. Within the perspective of some explanatory 
theories, the distinction between regulation and legislation does not always add much 
additional explanatory or predictive value to regulatory theories. The explanatory power of a 
market failure as a driving force of public interest regulation for example, does not really 
depend on whether decision making powers have been centralized or decentralized. From 
other perspectives, the distinction is important. The explanatory power of variables like rent-
seeking and capture may differ according to the level of regulatory decision making. 
According to some theories, delegation may help to prevent inefficient rent extraction by 
politicians (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). According to others, that is where problems of 
unaccountable regulators begin (Martimort, 1999). In the remaining of this article we will use 
the term regulation irrespective of its centralized or decentralized character and only introduce 
the distinction between regulation and legislation if this distinction is crucial for the particular 
hypothesis or theory in question. For a perspective on the use of the term regulation and its 
meaning in this respect, see Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds.), 2004, chapter one.   5 
In the rest of this chapter, I will review economic theories of regulation and their criticisms. 
Other reviews of the regulatory literature are Aranson (1990), Baron (1995), Ekelund (1998), 








The first group of regulation theories proceeds from the assumptions of full information, 
perfect enforcement and benevolent regulators. According to these theories, the regulation of 
firms or other economic actors contributes to the promotion of the public interest. This public 
interest can further be described as the best possible allocation of scarce resources for 
individual and collective goods and services in society. In western economies, the allocation 
of scarce resources is to a significant extent coordinated by the market mechanism. In theory, 
it can even be demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, the allocation of resources by 
means of the market mechanism is optimal (Arrow, 1985). Because these conditions do 
frequently not apply in practice, the allocation of resources is not optimal from a theoretical 
perspective and a quest for methods of improving the resource allocation arises (Bator, 1958). 
This situation is described as a market failure. A market failure is a situation where scarce 
resources are not put to their highest valued uses. In a market setting, these values are 
reflected in the prices of goods and services. A market failure thus implies a discrepancy 
between the price or value of an additional unit of a particular good or service and its 
marginal cost or resource cost. Ideally in a market, the production by a firm should expand 
until a situation arises where the marginal resource cost of an additional unit equals its 
marginal benefit or price. Equalization of prices and marginal costs characterizes an 
equilibrium in a competitive market. If costs are lower than the given market price, a firm will 
profit from a further expansion of production. If costs are higher than price, a firm will 
increase its profits by curtailing production until price again equals marginal cost. A market 
equilibrium, and more generally an equilibrium of all markets is thus a situation of an optimal 
allocation of scarce resources. In this situation supply equals demand and under the given 
circumstances can market players do no better. A great number of conditions have to be 
satisfied for an optimal allocation in a competitive market economy to exist, see generally 
Boadway and Bruce (1984). 
 
One of the methods of achieving efficiency in the allocation of resources when a market 
failure is identified, is government regulation (Arrow, 1970, 1985; Shubik, 1970). In the 
earlier development of the public interest theories of regulation, it was assumed that a market 
failure was a sufficient condition to explain government regulation (Baumol, 1952). But soon 
the theory was criticized for its Nirwana approach, implying that it assumed that theoretically 
efficient institutions could be seen to efficiently replace or correct inefficient real world 
institutions (Demsetz, 1968). This criticism has led to the development of a more serious 
public interest theory of regulation by what has been variously referred to as the “New 
Haven” or “Progressive School” of Law and Economics (Ogus in Jordan and Levi-Faur, 2004, 
Rose-Ackerman, 1988, 1992; Noll, 1983, 1989a). In the original theory, the transaction costs 
and information costs of regulation were assumed to be zero. By taking account of these costs, 
more comprehensive public interest theories developed. It could be argued that government 
regulation is comparatively the more efficient institution to deal with a number of market 
failures (Whynes and Bowles, 1981). For example, with respect to the public utilities it could   6 
argued that the transaction cost of government regulation to establish fair prices and a fair rate 
of return are lower than the costs of unrestricted competition (Goldberg, 1979). Equivalently, 
it could be argued that social regulation in some cases would be a more efficient institution to 
deal with the pollution of the environment or with dealing with accidents in the workplace 
than private negotiations between affected parties could. Regulators would not be plagued by 
failures in the information market and they could more easily bundle information to determine 
the point where the marginal cost of intervention equalizes the marginal social benefits 
(Leland, 1979; Asch, 1988). These more serious versions of the public interest theories do not 
assume that regulation is perfect. They do assume the presence of a market failure, that 
regulation is comparatively the more efficient institution and that for example deregulation 
takes place when more efficient institutions develop. These theories also assume that 
politicians act in the public interest or that the political process is efficient and that 
information on the costs and benefits of regulation is widely distributed and available (Noll, 
1989a). The core of this basic framework is captured in the following diagram.  
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Imagine an unregulated natural monopoly firm supplying public utility services. The firm 
makes supernormal profits, charges different prices to different consumer groups and does not 
supply services to high-cost consumers in rural areas. Economic theory predicts an inefficient 
allocation of resources. Without regulatory intervention these costs are at its highest at the 
point where the EL-curve intersects with the vertical axe (intersection not visible). Intervening 
in the market results in a decline of these welfare cost. The stronger the level of intervention, 
the lower the welfare losses in the private sector will be. The naïve public interest theory of 
regulation for example, would explain ‘fair rate of return’ regulation from the presence of the 
natural monopoly firm. Prices must decline and production increased until societal resources 
are allocated efficiently. The more complex public interest theories of regulation take the 
costs of regulatory intervention into account. The more a regulator intervenes in the private 
operation of the firm, the higher the intervention costs will be (curve IC). The regulator must 
have information on cost and demand facing the firm before efficient prices can be   7 
determined. There will be compliance cost for the firm in terms of time, effort and resources. 
It will have to comply with procedures, adapt its administration and incur productivity losses. 
Once put into practice, the cost of monitoring firm behavior and enforcement of the 
regulations arises. It is to be expected that the firm will behave strategically and conceal or 
disguise any relevant information for the regulator. Furthermore, indirect costs are to be 
expected. The less profit the firm makes, the lower the effort in decreasing production cost or 
in developing new products and production technologies. Also less tangible effects are 
predicted. Regulatory intervention makes private investments less secure: risk premiums rise, 
investments decline and economic growth will slowdown, etc. The regulator is aware of these 
costs and has several options to choose from: it could for example regulate prices or profits or 
a combination of both. Whichever it chooses, there will be different intervention costs and 
different consequences for static and dynamic efficiency. The optimal level of intervention 
(Iopt) implies trading off resources allocated to increasing levels of regulatory intervention and 
decreasing levels of inefficient firm behavior. Complicating the policy options further, for 
politicians there are alternatives to the regulation of prices, profits, service levels, etc. The 
legislator could also decide to franchise an exclusive right to operate the market or erect a 
public enterprise to maximize welfare. Again, these institutions require different cost of 
intervention and have different effects in terms of static and dynamic efficiency or other 
policy goals. Amongst others, they differ with respect to the informational requirements, the 
administrative costs, the burden for the private sector including the cost of errors, 
distributional effects, governance, accountability, risks of capture and corruption, and more. 
The public interest theories of regulation thus basically assume a comparative analysis of 
institutions to have taken place to efficiently allocate scarce resources in the economy.  
Equivalent reasoning applies to the field of social regulation. Imagine that lifting weight, for 
example a patient in a hospital or cement in the construction sector, creates back trouble or 
even work disability. Employees are often not very well aware of the risks they run, and even 
if they do they will find it difficult to deal with small risks such as 0,0001. The costs involved 
however, may be considerable: medical costs, lost earnings and risk of injury and pain, and 
consequences for relatives and friends. The inefficiency in the allocation of resources in the 
absence of regulation is again depicted by the curve EL. A regulator may decide on, for 
example, regulating maximum weights. She needs to identify the potential risk involved, how 
this risk varies with exposure to lower weights and different circumstances. Then the 
maximum allowable weight lifting must be determined. The regulator knows that increasing 
levels of intervention or standard setting will increase costs (curve IC) . The more detailed 
and precise, the higher the regulatory costs. The higher the weight standard, the higher also 
compliance costs will be: more nurses in the hospital and increasing use of capital equipment 
in the construction sector. Indirect costs will also increase with the level of intervention: there 
will be a lower ratio of input to output and substitution between now comparatively higher 
priced labor and capital equipment. Not only will employment decline but also the speed of 
technical change. The setting of the standard lowers the incentive to seek for technologies to 
further prevent lifting costs below the standard. Again, the regulator is aware of these costs 
and has several options to choose from. It could set an output or performance standard 
limiting the number of incidents. It could prescribe an input standard by specifying the use of 
certain care technologies or machinery. Alternatively, it could set a target standard that 
imposes criminal liability for certain harmful consequences or it could impose process 
standards obligating procedures to have the firm identify the risks and deal with them. All 
these forms of intervention have different intervention costs and compliance costs and 
different effects in terms of static and dynamic efficiency or other policy goals. The optimal 
standard or level of intervention depicted in the diagram is Iopt. And again, complicating 
matters further, for political decision makers there are alternative institutions to regulation,   8 
such as providing the firm and the employees with information and have private law and tort 
liability to deal with any costs involved or, in cases of severe dangers to life and health, a 
prohibition to use of certain techniques, equipment or materials.   
 
Summarizing, the public interest theories of regulation depart from essentially three 
assumptions: the prevalence of a market failure, the assumption of a ‘benevolent regulator’ or, 
alternatively, an efficient political process and the choice of efficient regulatory institutions. 
Starting from the allocation of scarce resources by a competitive market mechanism, four 
types of market failures can be distinguished. Discrepancies between values and resource 
costs can arise as a result of imperfect competition, unstable markets, missing markets or 
undesirable market results. Imperfect competition will cause prices to deviate from marginal 
resource cost. Unstable markets are characterized by dynamic inefficiencies with respect to 
the speed at which these markets clear or stabilize. These instabilities waste scarce resources. 
Missing markets imply the demand for socially valuable goods and services for which total 
value exceeds total cost but where prices or markets do not arise. And finally, even if the 
competitive market mechanism allocates scarce resources efficiently, the outcomes of the 
market processes might still considered to be unjust or undesirable from other social 
perspectives. I shall discuss these market failures in turn, assuming in first instance that the 
government acts as an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent regulator (Dixit, 1996).  
 
 
2.1.1 Imperfect competition 
 
In the first place, an efficient market mechanism implies certain rules and regulations and 
assumes that individual property rights are established, allocated and protected and that 
freedom to contract exists and is enforced (Pejovich, 1979). Not only are the cost of market 
transactions reduced by property and contract law, also the protection of property rights and 
the enforcement of contract compliance is more efficiently organized collectively than 
individually. The freedom to contract can, however, also be used to achieve cooperation 
between parties opposed to efficient market operation. Agreements between producers to keep 
prices high and supplied quantities artificially low, will give rise to prices deviating from the 
marginal costs. A dominant position by one or a few firms also gives rise to prices departing 
from marginal costs. Anti-monopoly legislation is aimed at maintaining the efficient market 
operation through merger control and by prohibiting anticompetitive agreements or behavior. 
More importantly for this review, are the special characteristics of certain products and 
production processes in sectors such as the energy sector, telecommunication, transport, 
postal services and water. Much of the so-called economic regulation relates to these sectors. 
In order to explain some of the market failures in these fields, I will make use of the diagram 
below where a simplified market situation of a typical single product firm in such a sector is 
depicted. The diagram shows the declining average cost curve AC of a typical firm and the 
market demand curve D. Marginal costs are assumed to be constant and equal to Pmc. The 
market demand curve D or average revenue (AR) intersects with the declining part of the 
average cost curve of the firm, which implies that average cost are minimized if the 
production is concentrated in one firm. If several companies with the same production 
technology produce the same total quantity, the unit costs of production rise. For this reason, 
this situation is called a natural monopoly. For the more precise conditions of a natural 
monopoly, see Baumol et al., 1982. 
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An example of how such a situation arises is when the production process requires a great 
deal of sunk capital for the installment of a distribution network. You can think of a network 
of pipes, wires, cables or railroads to supply gas, electricity, telecommunication, television 
signals, or transport services respectively. In those cases, the cost per service (average costs) 
continues to decline as the production of goods and services increases (Baumol, 1977). In an 
unrestricted market, several failures will appear. First of all, a firm contemplating of entering 
the market will realize that entry will provoke price competition from the incumbent firm, 
driving prices down to marginal costs. If that is the case, the sunk costs necessary to set-up 
production cannot be recovered and the firm will decide not to enter. If the firm thinks it is 
more efficient than the incumbent firm, so-called “wars of attrition” will arise, leading to 
bankruptcy and waste of scarce resources. Second, if the incumbent firm is indeed a natural 
monopolist it will maximize profits by equalizing marginal costs and marginal revenues (Pm 
in the diagram). Under the usual assumptions of the inability to price discriminate and the 
inability to prevent arbitrage, the firm will limit production (to Qm ) and set profit maximizing 
prices to clear the market. As a result prices will deviate significantly from marginal costs 
(Train, 1997). Next, the firm knows if it has invested huge amounts of sunk capital, it will be 
vulnerable to expropriation by political decision makers (Newbery, 2001). Third parties will 
rationally expect the firm not to exit the market as long as prices are above marginal cost even 
though they are insufficient to recoup the fixed costs of the network. As a result of these 
political risks, risk premiums will rise and the firm will under-invest (Sidak and Spulber, 
1998). Furthermore, entry is expected to take place, not only when these markets develop or 
in highly profitable parts of the market, but also in the case firms consider themselves to be 
more efficient than the incumbent firm. Productive inefficiency is the result and cut-throat 
competition will appear. For a number of these natural monopolies, history has shown these 
events to take place (Kahn, 1988; Priest, 1993; Vietor, 1989; 1999). Finally, from a social 
point of view the market outcomes market outcomes will be discriminatory or unjust. High-
cost consumers will not be served, consumers who cannot switch to alternative supply will 
pay discriminatory high profit maximizing prices and the firm will make huge profits at the 
cost of consumers.   10 
To promote a more efficient and equitable allocation of scarce resources, these natural 
monopolies are either put under control of the state, as happened in many European countries, 
or highly regulated, as for example is the practice in the United States. In the former case, 
these firms are instructed to maximize welfare in stead of profit. In the latter case, regulation 
consists of stopping entry and enforce price or profit rules that promote an efficient and 
equitable allocation of resources (Schmalensee, 1979; Braeutigam, 1989). For example, prices 
are set equal to average costs by means of rate of return regulation (price Pac in the figure 2) 
and a price structure is determined such that the firm breaks even. Ideally, the optimal price 
would of course be a price according to marginal resource cost. This however, would lead to 
financial losses, depicted by the difference between Pmc and ACopt. At Qopt the cost per unit is 
ACopt, while the revenues per unit are only Pmc, which in the diagram is about 30% too low to 
cover costs. The regulator thus has to choose between the inefficiencies of subsidies or a price 
that covers cost, but that is not ‘first best’ efficient. Actual regulations taking into account 
limitations on information and enforcement are discussed in section 3.2.1 Privatization and 
Regulatory reform, and following. 
 
2.1.2. Market instabilities 
 
A more efficient allocation of resource may not only be accomplished by a redress of 
imperfectly competitive markets but also by stabilizing inherently unstable markets. 
Imbalances within an economy occur at the level of separate markets and on a macro level. In 
separate markets, destructive or excessive competition may arise, often as a result of long-
term over-capacity. The establishment of a new equilibrium may take a long time if the 
individual market players are in a prisoner’s dilemma. For all market parties jointly, 
efficiency is achieved if the existing over-capacity is rationalized. For an individual producer, 
however, the ‘sunk costs’ may imply that it is rational to wait until other suppliers have 
withdrawn from the market. Because this consideration applies to all producers, over-capacity 
can persist for a considerable time. Over-capacity situations may also arise when the 
production capacity is adjusted to demand at peak moments or peak periods. Examples are 
peak loads in the rush-hour (electricity, electronic communication, busses, underground 
railways and trains), during the harvest in agriculture (trucks) and during the tourist high 
season (touring cars, aircraft). The following diagram illustrates this instability. 
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Assume that because of some shortage in supply in a former period, prices have risen to P1, 
which is somewhat above market equilibrium price Pe. At that price, supply is Q1. However, 
at that quantity, the market can only clear at price P2. Suppliers will react to that price by 
supplying only Q2 units in the next period. However, at these quantities, the market will clear 
only at very high prices, motivating suppliers in the next period to supply increasingly more, 
etc. Excessive or ruinous competition may also arise in a natural oligopoly setting. In a natural 
oligopoly situation productive efficiency is achieved if only a few companies supply the 
market. The small number of companies allows each of them to react to each other’s market 
strategies. One of the outcomes may be a persistent price war. Effects are that prices may 
decline below average cost and that price dispersion is increased. Both effects create 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources or in consumer decision-making. Furthermore, 
excessive competition may be detrimental to safety and reliability when consumers cannot 
observe or verify the quality of goods and services (Kahn, 1988, pp. 172-178). In the past 
regulatory practices assumed that situations of excessive competition applied to sectors such 
as air travel, passenger transport, freight or transport by water (trucks, taxis, shipping). For 
these sectors, business licensing restrictions were devised and the capacity was rationed, 
sometimes in combination with minimum price regulation. Regulatory theories however, 
considered the collection of excessive competition-rationales of government intervention to 
be ‘an empty box’ (see Breyer, 1982, pp. 29-32) and regulations might better be explained 
from a private interest perspective. Recently, modern regulatory theories developed several 
instances of structural market failures in potentially competitive sectors Telser, 1978, 1994, 
1996; Button and Nijkamp, 1997). Free entry may result in too much entry if costs are sunk in 
the form of production facilities or marketing expenditures. The increase in competition and 
the resulting decrease in consumer prices may not weigh up to the increase in the resource 
costs that entry requires. There may as well be insufficient entry if consumers value product 
diversity but firms do not enter because profit opportunities decrease with increased entry 
(Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Perry, 1984). Except at the level of the individual sectors, 
imbalances may also occur on a macro economic level. Market economies are characterized 
by a business cycle, the regular alternation of periods of increasing and declining economic 
activity. In the course of the  business cycle, a self-sustaining process develops in the product 
market that is not compensated by adjustments in the labor market. This arises partly because 
of lack of information, long-term labor contracts and efficiency wages. Trade-cycle policies 
can be desirable to prevent temporary disturbances which have permanent effects. For 
example, specialized investments with limited alternative value in other market segments may 
be permanently lost in a recession. Also, structural unemployment may arise when 
unemployed workers lose their skill and motivation. Finally, stabilization of the business 
cycle may be desirable to prevent the decline of production and employment such that 
different social groups are unequally affected by the economic rise and fall. But of course, all 
these regulations have their costs that have to be compared to the benefits in terms of 
increases in social welfare. 
 
Traditionally, trade-cycle policies are put into effect together with instruments of budgetary 
and monetary policy; for an overview of the significance of these instruments and the 
underlying theories, see Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk (2007). Because these instruments 
are not directed to specific sectors and can only take effect after some time, wage and price 
regulation have been developed in some market economies. To combat a wage-price spiral, 
governments have developed the legal means to freeze wages and prices for a period of 
between a half to one year, if necessary applicable in designated sectors (Ogus, 2004, pp. 
300ff. and Breyer, 1982, pp. 60ff.). Of course, because market economies have become global   12 




2.1.3 Missing markets 
 
Information problems and bounded rationality 
 
For a number of reasons, markets may be ‘missing’ for some goods and services for which the 
utility or the ‘willingness to pay’ exceeds the production costs. Missing markets may be the 
result of information problems and transaction costs. These problems and costs justify much 
of the social regulation that efficiently aims to protect the worker, the consumer and society 
at large. In practice, the full information assumption of a perfectly competitive economy is 
rarely found. With respect to the information that is available on goods and services in a 
market, it is useful to make a distinction between ‘search goods’, for which the quality of a 
product can be determined prior to purchase, ‘experience goods’, for which quality only 
becomes apparent after consumption of the good and ‘credence goods or trust goods’, for 
which the quality cannot even be established after consumption (See generally, Beales et al. 
1982; Armstrong, 2008; Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni, 1973; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 
2006). Examples of each are the purchase of flowers, second-hand cars and repair firms, 
respectively. Consumers and workers have an interest in being informed on relevant aspects 
of their purchases and of their jobs, such as the safety and health dimensions. In a competitive 
market employers and producers also have interest in revealing the relevant characteristics of 
jobs and products. However, the ‘information market’ is characterized by market failures and 
these failures spill over to the market for goods and services (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979). On 
the demand side, information will be searched until the marginal cost equals marginal benefit. 
However, since search intensifies competition, it produces external benefits for uninformed 
parties. As a result information is searched in suboptimal amounts from a social perspective. 
Furthermore, at a general level information will be undersupplied. The production of 
information is costly, but the dissemination is not. If competition drives prices down to 
marginal distribution costs, it will be difficult to cover the fixed cost of production. Also, the 
market will undersupply the optimal amount of information when producers are not able to 
fully appropriate all the revenues from their investments. Examples are the investments in the 
knowledge of the health and safety dimensions of chemical substances. And certainly, 
information will not be supplied when it is not in the interest of the sector itself to do so, as is 
the case in situations of collective ‘bads’ such as smoking hazards. When it is not possible to 
establish the relevant quality dimensions of particular goods or services in advance, 
purchasers will be prepared to pay an average price corresponding with the average expected 
quality. Sellers of high quality products will not be prepared to sell at that asking price, and 
will withdraw from the market. The end-result is that the quality of goods and services will 
decline, as will the price buyers are prepared to pay (Akerlof, 1970). In this process of 
adverse selection, high quality goods are driven from the market by low-quality goods. In 
addition, the asymmetric distribution of information can also give rise to moral hazard in the 
enforcement of contracts, which means that parties take advantage of their information lead. 
Examples would be food processors who use poor quality food and lawyers who give 
unfounded advice.  
 
The following diagram illustrates how valuable products or services may disappear from the 
market and how a market is finally missing (adapted from Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). 
Imagine high quality car repair firms who are offering their services (S1
h), and drivers who   13 
cannot establish the quality of the reparations. Had they known the quality of the services 
supplied, they would have bought Q1 units. Drivers however, are not informed of the quality 
of the firms and just know there are high and low quality firms. Visiting a repair firm, a driver 
expects ex ante the services supplied to be of average quality.They are willing to pay for the 
services according to the expected average quality, which is determined by the ratio of high 
and low quality firms in the market. Their actual market demand is thus not D1
h, but D2
h. At 
that price, only Q2 units are supplied in the market, so the ratio of high and low quality firms 
decreases. Eventually, patients will come to learn the change of this ratio in the market and 
adapt their demand accordingly. The demand for high quality services shifts to D3
h.  
Professional firms who supply high quality and high cost services, cannot supply these 
services at the lower market price and will leave the market. Now the supply of high quality 
services decreases to S2
h.   
 
 

















The final result is a missing market for high quality services, although high quality suppliers 
are willing to sell high quality services, which consumers are willing to buy. Of course, 
suppliers are interested in communicating the quality of their work, particularly if it is higher 
than average. For example, they will try to create a reputation on delivering high quality 
services. But that solution only works if consumers purchase these services regularly or if 
they can profit from ‘hearsay’. For some experience or credence goods, this will not be the 
case. But even if information markets would work perfectly, some market failures would keep 





Consumers and workers are assumed to make rational, welfare maximizing choices. In this 
respect a distinction should be made between the rationality of the outcome and the rationality 
of the decision making process leading to that outcome. If consumers or workers experience   14 
limits in absorbing and evaluating information, they will adapt their preferences and their 
decision making processes accordingly. Given those limits, the outcome of the decision 
making process may be defined as ‘boundedly’ rational. Further research along these lines led 
to the development of a new branch of economics, behavioral economics which incorporates 
insights from psychology and sociology into economics (Dellavigna, 2009; McFadden, 1999; 
Rabin, 2002; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2001). 
 
To be able to make the relevant trade-offs and to decide fully rationally, consumers and 
workers should be able not only to fully understand all the relevant characteristics of the 
products and jobs at hand, but they also must be able to understand and evaluate future 
developments that will have an impact on decisions that are currently taken. According to 
some scholars, three conditions must be met for rational behavior to occur (Poiesz, 2004). 
Economic subjects must be motivated to make rational decisions, they must have the capacity 
to make such decisions and they must have the opportunity to decide rationally. Whether or 
not these conditions are met will depend on a variety of circumstances such as the 
characteristics of the products, activities or workplaces involved and the nature of the 
competitive process. Products and workplaces may for example be characterized by their 
degree of risk involved, health risks, financial risks or other. Research has shown that 
consumers and workers find it hard to adequately deal with risks (Thaler, 1992; Margolis, 
1996). Accidents with products or risks to life and health at work or on the road are usually 
low probability events in the order of for example 0,0001 or perhaps even one in a million. 
Most people will find it hard to think and act rationally on such events. Small risks are often 
overestimated and larger risks are underestimated. Preferences appear to be anomalous with 
respect to decisions concerning the future or uncertainty. Willingness to pay studies reveal 
that workers or consumers are willing to pay a certain amount to lower health risks with a 
certain percentage, but at the same time are willing to pay far larger amount to bring forth an 
equivalent percentage reduction toward a situation of zero risk. More generally, the following 
distortions have been noticed in the literature (Dellavigna, 2009; Sunstein, 2002, pp. 33-53): 
-  people tend to think events are more probable if they can recall an incident of their 
occurrence (availability heuristic); 
-  people tend to believe that something is either safe or unsafe and that it is possible to 
abolish risk entirely: exposure to dangerous substances always implies cancer and 
natural chemicals are less harmful compared to manmade chemicals (intuitive 
toxicology) ; 
-  certain beliefs become generally accepted because people simply accept other people’s 
belief (social cascades); 
-  people often focus on small pieces of complex problems without looking into causal 
changes: a ban on asbestos may cause manufacturers to use even less safe substitutes 
(over-simplification); 
-  small dangers are easily noticed, benefits are minimized: “better safe than sorry” 
(perceptual illusion); 
-  people have an emotional, mental short-cut reaction to certain processes and products: 
high benefits and low risk tend mentally to become aligned (affect heuristic); 
-  people’s reaction to risks are often based on the ‘worst case’ of the outcome rather 
than on the probability of its occurrence (alarmist bias); 
-  people worry more about proportions than about numbers: they worry more about a 
the risk of one in a hundred than about the risk of one in a million even though the first 
group consist of  for example 1000 persons and the second of 200 million people 
(proportionality effect);   15 
-  evidence suggests that people assess their willingness to pay far differently when 
taken in isolation (just skin cancer) compared to assessments in cross-category 
comparisons: willingness to pay to prevent skin cancer and to protect coral reefs 
(separate evaluation incoherence). 
The general implication is that ordinary people make mistakes: they rely on mental shortcuts, 
they are subject to social influences that lead them astray and they neglect trade-offs 
(Sunstein, 2002; Breyer, 1993; Viscusi, 1998). The conclusion is that people are only 
boundedly rational and that consequently the allocation of resources driven by misguided or 
mistaken decisions will be inefficient (Simon, 1948; Kreps, 1998). These problems may be 
exacerbated if regulators act upon such preference to change the allocation of resources. 
 
The problems of bounded rationality, adverse selection and moral hazard may explain the 
existence of, for example, the introduction of private or public certificates, minimum quality 
standards for the safety of food, toys, cars etc., licenses and other trading regulations for 
professional groups such as building contractors, hairdressers and plasterers, and more. By 
means of these rules, minimum requirements can be set on the commercial knowledge, 
professional skill and creditworthiness, and more so that the transaction costs decline and the 
information problems are reduced (Leland, 1979; Shapiro, 1986; Zerbe and Urban, 1988)). 
Rules relating to misleading information aim to minimize the cost of moral hazard (Beales, 
Craswell and Salop, 1981; Schwartz and Wilde, 1979). Because of the nature of credence or 
trust goods, it is difficult to set minimum quality standards precisely in those cases where the 
risks of moral hazard are high. In such circumstances, legally sanctioned self regulation can 
combat the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Van den Bergh and Faure, 1991; 
Den Hertog, 1993). Not only do those involved have a vested interest in the maintenance of 
the minimum quality, they are also better able to formulate and maintain quality rules (Gehrig 
and Jost, 1995). If purchasers cannot establish quality levels, minimizing search costs by a 
ban on advertisement may even be efficient (Barzel, 1982, 1985). Problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard arise particularly in insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976). Insured parties have superior information available with respect to the incidence of 
risks but they lack information regarding the quality and independence of intermediaries. In 
many countries, social legislation is introduced as a reaction to these problems, and rules are 
established for intermediaries. It is a matter of empirical research to determine if those 
regulations are to be preferred above private solutions, such as developing a reputation, tort 
liability and self-regulation. 
 
However, as Breyer (1993) has suggested if preferences are distorted, a vicious circle of 
public perceptions, parliamentary action and regulatory methods may arise. In economics 
revealed or stated preferences are the main explanatory device and evaluative measure of 
regulatory practices. Justification of regulation or the explanation of regulation from a market 
failure perspective becomes difficult if preferences are distorted (Adler and Posner, 2001; 
Sunstein, 2002). Hence, paternalists theories of government intervention become once more 




Externalities and public goods 
 
In addition to information failures, prohibitively high transaction costs may also result in 
missing markets. Transaction costs can impede, for example, the development of a market for 
the efficient use of the environmental goods. In a market economy, resources are efficiently   16 
used when the production of goods is increased until the marginal costs equal the marginal 
benefits of production. In a market with perfect competition, an individual producer aiming 
for maximization of profit will increase its production until the marginal costs equal the 
market price. However, an inefficient allocation of resources can arise in the presence of 
externalities (Meade, 1973). Externalities are cost or utility effects for third parties outside the 
market interactions where these external effects develop. An often cited textbook example 
concerns the discharge of waste material by a factory such that downstream drinking water 
companies must incur costs of water purification. Because the private costs for the 
discharging manufacturer differ from the social costs, production will be increased further 
than would be desirable from the point of view of efficient allocation of resources. According 
to the Coase theorem, an efficient allocation of resources can nonetheless result from a 
process of negotiation in the case of clearly defined property rights and in the absence of 
transaction costs (Coase, 1960). However, information cost, bargaining cost or enforcement 
cost may prevent efficient solutions. Negotiation costs can be prohibitively high if several 
parties are involved in the negotiating process or if elements of strategic behavior are present 
(Veljanovski, 1982a). Furthermore, there may be situations where the aggregated damage is 
large, while the damage per person may be too small to organize and participate in any action. 
Also, it may not even be known who causes the damage, as for example in the case of secret 
oil dumping at sea, or it may not be known which substances causes the damage (acid rain). 
The damage may also manifest itself years after exposure, as in the case of cancer from 
asbestos or future generations may be the main victims. In those cases it will be difficult to 
prove causality between the negligent act and damages. Finally, even if hold liable, firms may 
not be able to financially compensate for the damages. In all such cases, the market failure is 
accompanied by a private law failure and regulation may be the more efficient solution if the 
costs of regulatory intervention are lower than the benefits in terms of welfare loss control 
(Gruenspecht and Lave, 1989). Examples of such internalization of social costs are safety 
regulations for items such as automobiles and food, noise levels for aircraft, the obligation to 
use catalytic converters in automobiles and limits to the emission of hazardous substances in 
permits. 
 
Markets may also be missing with goods and services having public goods characteristics 
(Samuelson, 1954). For the supplier of such goods it is difficult to exclude others from 
consumption who fail to pay for the good (non-excludability). In the second place, 
consumption of such goods by one person do not diminish the consumption opportunities by 
other persons (non-rivalness, Musgrave, 1969). Classical examples of these types of goods are 
technical innovations, the production of information, the broadcasting of television and radio 
signals, lighthouses, public order, defense, street lighting, and sea defenses. As a result, public 
goods are either not produced at all or not in the optimum quantities because of free-rider 
problems and problems with establishing the ‘willingness to pay’ for these goods (Bohm, 
1987). If a supplier has already produced the goods, consumers will be tempted to free ride on 
the willingness to pay of others since they can no longer be excluded from consumption of the 
good. To establish the optimum quantity of the collective good, the marginal utility of single 
increments of this good must be known from all the consumers involved. Because of its non-
rival character, the aggregate willingness to pay for marginal units is compared against the 
marginal costs. When consumers are asked to reveal this willingness to pay for extra units, 
they will exaggerate or minimize this for strategic reasons. Exaggeration will occur when the 
willingness to pay for extra units is not linked with actual payment for extra units of the good. 
Minimization will occur when the financing of the public good is linked to the willingness to 
pay that was indicated. Because consumers cannot be excluded, there will be a tendency to 
free ride on others’ willingness to pay, and for strategic reasons they will indicate only a   17 
modest willingness to pay for themselves. For these reasons, a market economy will not be 
able to produce these goods in optimum quantities, if at all. Government regulation is 
necessary to establish the optimum quantity of the goods concerned, and to enforce the 
payment of these goods. Many goods, such as radio and television broadcasting, research and 
development, education, health care, parks and roads have a public good dimension. In such 
cases also, government regulation can theoretically contribute to a more efficient use of 
resources in an economy. 
 
2.1.4 Undesirable market results 
 
According to the public interest theories, regulation can be explained not only by imperfect 
competition, unstable market processes and missing markets, but also by the need to prevent 
or correct undesirable market results. In a competitive market economy, participants in the 
economic process are rewarded according to their marginal productivity contribution. This 
result of the market process may be undesirable for economic and other reasons. In the first 
place it is possible that a redistribution has large incentive effects (Stiglitz, 1994, p. 47 ff). In 
the second place it is possible that an efficient redistribution will increase the general level of 
economic welfare when dilemma’s such as the prisoner’s dilemma impede voluntary transfers 
(Hochman and Rogers, 1969, 1970). An efficient redistribution might also take place if the 
marginal utility of income diminishes and satisfaction capacities do not differ widely among 
people. However, in economics it is conventional to assume the unfeasibility of cardinal 
measurement of utility and interpersonal utility comparison, so that this last form of efficient 
redistribution cannot theoretically be justified from an economic point of view 
(Robbins, 1932). In the third place, it can be argued that bounded rationality offers a number 
of explanations to correct market outcomes from the point of view of efficiency: real 
preferences are not adequately reflected in market behavior and values or their formation is 
the result of distorting contexts (Sunstein, 1997). Redistributive policies on behalf of drug 
addicts or other disadvantaged groups often recognizes that people do not ‘prefer’ to become 
disadvantaged in this way. Furthermore, it has widely been established that consumers have 
social preferences and care about the inequality of market outcomes (Dellavigna, 2009). 
 
The correction of undesirable market results can finally also be considered desirable for other 
than economic reasons, such as considerations of justice, paternalistic motives or ethical 
principles (Ogus, 2005). In that case, tradeoffs may arise between, for example, economic 
efficiency and equality: the incentive effects of redistribution may result in a decline in the 
level of individual utility (Okun, 1975). Public interest theories are most often applied by 
economists to explain regulation as an aim for economic efficiency (Joskow and Noll, 1981, 
p. 36). In other cases, public interest theories are interpreted more broadly and regulation is 
predicted to correct inefficient or inequitable market practices (Posner, 1974). According to 
this last view, regulation might be said to aim for a socially efficient use of scarce resources 
as opposed to an economically efficient allocation of resources, where economically is 
interpreted in a narrow way. However, according to some other views, a complete efficiency 
analysis should be able to include principles and values like corrective justice (Kaplov and 
Shavell, 2002; Zerbe, 2001), as long as these values and principles consume scarce resources. 
Examples of laws and rules intended to prevent or ameliorate undesirable market results are a 
legal minimum wage, maximum rents, cross-subsidies in postal delivery, telephone calls and 
passenger transport, rules enhancing the accessibility of health care, rules guaranteeing an 
income in the event of sickness, unemployment, disablement, old-age, ‘reasonable rate of 
return regulation, and more.  
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2.2 Criticism of Public Interest Theories of Regulation 
 
Theories explaining regulation as an efficient solution to market failures, have been criticized 
from different angles. First, the core of the public interest theories of regulation, the market 
failure theory, has been the object of criticism. Second, the hypothesis that government 
regulation is efficient or effective, has been claimed to have been invalidated by empirical 
research. Contrary to this criticism, it has in the third place been argued that it is impossible to 
test or refute the public interest theories of regulation. Finally, it has been argued that the 
public interest theories are incomplete: the formation of public preferences and the translation 
of these interests into welfare maximizing regulatory measures is lacking from these theories. 
 
2.2.1 Market failures as model failure 
 
The theory that regulation can be explained as an answer to market failures has been criticized 
from several points of view (Cowan, 1988; Zerbe and McCurdy, 1999, 2000). First, the 
conclusion that monopoly power, externalities or any other so-called market failure gives rise 
to an inefficient allocation of resources, can only be understood by assuming a model in 
which some of the transaction costs involved are absent. The allocation of resources appears 
as efficient if transaction costs are included in the analysis (Dahlman, 1979; Toumanoff, 
1984). Monopoly power for example only appears to have inefficient outcomes. Once 
transaction costs such as the inability of the monopolist to price discriminate or to prevent 
arbitrage or the inability of the consumers to organize and negotiate effectively, is taken into 
account the market outcome is efficient. The same reasoning applies to externalities. Marginal 
cost appear to differ from marginal benefits, but once the transaction costs of the market 
mechanism are taken into account, the market outcomes turn out to be efficient. The cost-
minimizing outcome has been attained. 
 
Second, in practice the market mechanism itself is often able to develop institutions to 
compensate for any inefficiencies. Firms will devise ways for example to highlight essential 
quality aspects such as safety or superior performance. Problems of adverse selection are 
solved by companies themselves by, for example, the issue of guarantees, the use of brand 
names and extensive advertising campaigns as a signal of quality (Nelson, 1974). The market 
sector also succeeds in the production of goods that have traditionally been characterized as 
typical public goods, such as lighthouses (Coase, 1974). So-called externalities have been 
shown to have been internalized by the market itself (Cheung, 1973, 1978). The assumption 
of market failure when a dominant firm supplies the market is similarly criticized (Demsetz, 
1976). Any significant returns could be a result of superior efficiency of such companies and 
furthermore, account must be taken of the possibility of competition for the market (Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig, 1982) as opposed to competition in the market.  
Third, a more general criticism of the theory of market failure is its limited explanatory 
power. An economist generally needs only 10 minutes to rationalize government intervention 
by constructing some form of market failure (Peltzman, 1989). The market failure theory is an 
inconsistent and unnecessary part of the public interest theories of regulation. An adequate 
explanatory regulatory theory must explain how and why regulation is comparatively the best 
transaction cost minimizing institution in the efficient allocation of resources for particular 
goods, services or societal values (Zerbe, 2001). The concept of market failures does not 
contribute to that task. 
 
2.2.2 Is regulation efficient and effective?   19 
 
In the second place, the original theory assumes that government regulation is effective and 
can be implemented without great cost (Posner, 1974). So precisely the transaction costs and 
information costs, which underlie market failure, are assumed to be absent in the case of 
government regulation. This assumption has been criticized in both empirical and theoretical 
research. Theoretical research, the theory of the second best, has demonstrated that the partial 
aim for efficient allocation does not make the economy as a whole more efficient if 
unavoidable inefficiencies persist elsewhere in the economy (Ng, 1990). Unavoidable 
inefficiencies such as dominance in product markets or taxation distort the allocation in the 
economy at large. Not only is the good concerned produced in insufficient quantities, but also 
too many resources are devoted to the production of other goods and services in the economy. 
These distortions also mean that the allocation in factor markets is suboptimal. Suppose prices 
are lower than marginal cost (road congestion) by ways that cannot be controlled by the 
regulator. Suppose furthermore that a regulator wants to set welfare maximizing prices in a 
sector under its control. In that case, it is of little use to aim for allocative efficiency through, 
for example, price regulation of public transport by setting prices equal to marginal costs. A 
‘second best’ solution would be to supply transport to the other sectors of the economy at 
prices lower than marginal costs until the welfare loss of the price subsidy is equal to the 
welfare gain of reduced supply in the congested sectors. This would require knowledge by the 
regulator of costs and demand schedules of all sectors of the economy. Furthermore, in reality 
a great many of these unavoidable inefficiencies exist. They result from external effects, 
taxation, imperfect competition and flawed information. That renders the achievement of a 
second-best optimum unfeasible in practice (Utton, 1986), so that even less precise ‘third 
best’ rules and policies have been suggested (Ng, 1977). Other theoretical research points to 
fundamental flaws in policy making. Accurate predictions on how rules will work, can not be 
made if regulations changes the behavior of regulates and the structures in which they operate. 
Furthermore, the changes in the original situation by rules and regulations will be anticipated 
by rational actors (Kydland and Presscott, 1977; Boorsma, 1990). Optimal policies would thus 
become inconsistent. One effect is the preference for uniform and fixed rules rather than 
discretion for regulators, but other inefficiencies would then result from the heterogeneity of 
sectors, regions or firms (Kaplov, 1992, 1995; Latin, 1985). But of course the information to 
devise optimal policies and regulations is not available nor is enforcement perfect 
(Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987a, 1987b; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 1979). The results are 
inefficient rules, imperfect enforcement and incentives for firms and consumers to behave 
inefficiently (for a criticism of some of this research, Kelman, 1988). Examples are inefficient 
safety standards set by regulators, the selection of inefficient combinations of production 
factors by firms (Averch-Johnson effect) and the inefficient planning of investment projects 
(Viscusi, 1985; Baumol and Klevorick, 1970; Sweeney, 1981, and more generally on the 
interaction between firms and regulators: Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Theoretical research into 
the efficiency and effectiveness of government regulation gradually developed into theories of 
non-market failures equivalent to the theories of market failures (Wolf, 1987, 1993; Tullock, 
Seldon and Brady, 2002). These theories point to non-market failures such as: 
-  the lack of information on marginal benefit of regulatory agency activity and the 
consequential lack of incentives to equate marginal cost with marginal benefit; 
-  the lack of output valuation or indicators and the consequential lack of incentives to 
minimize cost or to end the regulatory activity; 
-  the lack of a market for regulatory control analogues to the market for corporate 
control, with its consequential failure to discipline managers; 
-  the inequalities in the distribution of the agency benefits as a result of capture or 
bargaining;   20 
-  the unavoidability of unintended effects, unexpected side-effects and even adverse 
effects of regulation. 
 
The exaggeration in some parts of the literature on the supposedly inefficiencies of 
government regulation led Wittman to argue that political markets were in effect efficient 
(Wittman, 1989, 1995; and criticizing this position, Lott, 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
Empirical research into the effectiveness and efficiency of government regulation also gives 
rise to criticism of the public interest theory. For a general overview of the effects of 
economic regulation, see Joskow and Rose (1989). The research into economic regulation was 
started with the famous article by Stigler and Friedland (1962), ‘What can regulators 
regulate’,  about the effects of price regulation on electricity producers. In this paper, they 
showed that regulation did not lower rates, the it had an insignificant effect on profits and that 
price discrimination was not significantly reduced. This paper started an entirely different way 
of thinking about government regulation. An earlier synthesis of this type of empirical 
research showed firstly that the influence of regulation on natural monopolies was slight if not 
non-existent (Jordan, 1972). In the second place, it appeared that regulating potentially 
competing sectors such as air traffic and freight resulted in an increase in prices and a 
restricted number of competitors. Empirical research further demonstrates that regulation 
prescribed an inefficient price structure in which mainly certain consumer groups received 
cross subsidies (Posner, 1971). Later research into the effects of economic deregulation 
demonstrated furthermore that mainly consumers, but to some extent even also producers, 
derived a benefit on balance from less government regulation (Winston, 1993, 1998). Often it 
were employees who benefitted from regulation. Deregulation increased welfare by 7-9% of 
GNP and employment increased as well. Social regulation appeared to keep costs and benefits 
more or less in balance (Hahn and Hird, 1991) although there is also empirical evidence 
suggesting that much social regulation is poorly targeted or is over-stringent (Sunstein, 1990; 
Hahn, 1996; Baldwin, 1990; Wilson, 1984). Research also suggested that about one third of 
the productivity slowdown in a decade resulted from the cost of social regulation (Gray, 
1987). A qualifying remark can be made pertaining to economic and social regulation, that it 
is often difficult if at all possible to quantify many of the benefits. For example, it is difficult 
to put a value on the distributional effects of cross-subsidies or the preservation of a variety of 
life forms, or to take account of the preferences of future generations. Finally, there are 
arguments for assuming that even competition legislation is sometimes misused as an 
instrument of monopolization (Baumol and Ordover, 1985; McChesney and Shughart II, 
1995). 
 
2.2.3 Testing the public interest theories of regulation 
 
Public interest theories usually assume that regulation aims to establish economic efficiency. 
Interpreted in this way, these theories are unable to explain why on occasion other objectives 
such as procedural fairness or redistribution are aimed for at the expense of economic 
efficiency (Joskow and Noll, 1981, p. 36). On the other hand, when it is assumed that 
regulation pursues social efficiency, another problem is encountered. Where there is conflict 
between efficiency and equity, it is impossible for at least two reasons to establish the social 
efficiency of regulation (Sen, 1979a, 1979b). Such conflicts may arise when regulators 
mandate for example universal service obligations for public utilities, cross-subsidies for 
certain consumer groups, the prohibition to use price discrimination, minimum wage 
legislation or rent control, and more generally the protection of disadvantaged groups. Firstly, 
in such situations the evaluation of social efficiency is difficult because evaluation standards 
of levels or dimensions of justice are not available. No agreement exists regarding the   21 
definition of justice in concrete situations (Dworkin, 1981). Secondly, the establishment of 
social efficiency of regulation requires that economic efficiency and justice be weighed 
against each other. A theoretically justified and practically usable scale of values that this 
calls for is not available (Ng, 1985). The absence of generally applicable standards of justice 
and the lack of insight into the relationship between justice and efficiency renders empirical 
testing of public interest theories as explanatory theories of regulation impossible. A key 
problem of the public interest theory is that the evaluating, normative theory of economic 
welfare is being used as a positive explanatory theory of regulation (Joskow and Noll, 1981). 
Empirical work of testing the public interest theories relative to the private interest theories 
has concentrated for the larger part on the effectiveness and not the efficiency of regulations: 
are prices lower, is price discrimination absent, is there a decrease in costs, did pollution 
decline, is influence of interest group detectable, etc. Examples include Jakee and Allen 
(1998), Kroszner and Strahan (1999), Tanguay et al (2004). 
 
 
2.2.4 The incompleteness of the public interest theory 
 
A final point of criticism is that public interest theories are incomplete. In the first place, the 
theories do not indicate how a given view on the public interest translates into legislative 
actions that maximize economic welfare (Posner, 1974). The political decision-making 
process consists of various participants who will aim for their own objectives under different 
constraints. In contrast to the theoretical model of a fully competitive market economy, it is 
unclear how the interaction of the participants in the political process will lead to maximum 
economic welfare. What is lacking is a rational choice theory leading to welfare 
maximization. Secondly, a theory of regulation should be able to predict which branches of 
industry or sectors should be regulated, and to whom the advantages and disadvantages are to 
accrue. The theory should also be able to predict what form regulation is to take, such as 
subsidies, restricted entry, or price regulations (Stigler, 1971). Public interest theories appear 
not to be able to adequately make predictions that are amenable to testing by empirical 
economic science (Stigler, 1971). Furthermore, facts are observed in social reality which are 
not well accounted for by public interest theories. Why should companies support and even 
aim for regulation intended to cream off excess profits? Of course, much normative public 
interest analysis has been undertaken on the forms of regulation, and not only of economic 
regulation. On the comparison of regulated private enterprises and public enterprises, for 
example De Alessie, 1980; Boardman and Vining, 1989; Martin and Parker, 1997; Megginson 
and Netter, 2001. This literature generally or cautiously argues that private enterprises are 
more efficient. There is also a the well-known literature on standards versus prices for 
damages, pollution and other externalities (Ogus, 1998, Cooter, 1984). Usually, the theories 
predict economic instruments to be more efficient, but in practice we more often find 
standards. Public interest theories find it difficult to explain these practices. On the choice of 
instruments more generally, valuable normative studies include Stewart (1981), Dewees 
(1983) and Trebilcock and Hartle (1982). On the comparison between regulation and liability, 
Burrows (1999), Dewees (1992), Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock (1996), Ogus (2007), Shavell 
(1984a, 1984b), Weitzman (1974), White and Wittman (1983), and Wittman (1977). These 
studies mostly focus on the efficiency properties of the instruments and often do not explain 
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2.3 Private Interest Theories of Regulation 
 
After the public interest theory had fallen into disrepute through empirical and theoretical 
research, the capture theory was developed mainly by political scientists; for a discussion see 
Posner (1974). This theory assumes that in the course of time, regulation will come to serve 
the interests of the industry involved. Legislators subject an industry to regulation by an 
agency if abuse of a dominant position is detected. In the course of time, other political 
priorities arrive on the agenda and the monitoring of the regulatory agency by legislators is 
relaxed. The agency will tend to avoid conflicts with the regulated company because it is 
dependent on this company for its information. It often also does not have unlimited resources 
which makes it aware of the costly effects of litigation of its decisions. Furthermore, there are 
career opportunities for the regulators in the regulated companies. This leads in time to the 
regulatory agency coming to represent the interests of the branch involved. For an overview 
of the various strategies available to be applied by agencies and regulated companies, see 
Owen and Braeutigam (1978).  
 
The capture theory is unsatisfactory in a number of respects (Posner, 1974). Firstly, there is 
insufficient distinction from the public interest theory, because the capture theory also 
assumes that the public interest underlies the start of regulation. Secondly, it is not clear why 
an industry succeeds in subjecting an agency to its interests but cannot prevent its coming into 
existence. Thirdly, regulation often appears to serve the interests of groups of consumers 
rather than the interests of the industry. Regulated companies are often obliged to extend their 
services beyond voluntarily chosen level of service. Examples are transport services, the 
supply of gas, water and electricity and telecommunication services to consumers living in 
widely scattered geographical locations. Fourthly, much regulation, such as environmental 
regulation, regulation of product safety and labor conditions are opposed by companies 
because of the negative effect on profitability. Finally, the capture theory is more of a 
hypothesis that lacks theoretical foundations. It does not explain why an industry is able to 
‘take over’ a regulatory agency and why, for example, consumer groups fail to prevent this 
takeover. Nor does it explain why the interaction between the firm and the agency is 
characterized by capture in stead of by bargaining. Recently dynamic capture theories have 
been developed, explaining the life-cycle of regulatory agencies evolving over time from 
acting in the public interest to becoming increasingly inefficient and more eager to please 
private interests (Martimort, 1999). According to these theories, capture is the result of the 
increasing power of the agency which arises because the agency in its ongoing relationship 
gets to know the firm better and better. The agency has thus more and more opportunities to 
pursue its own objective and the political principal can only control this by having more 
stringent administrative rules and fair and open procedures. This limitations ‘cripple’ the 
agency and makes it receptive for the influences of the regulated firm. 
 
 




In 1971 ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ by George Stigler appeared. This was the start 
of what some called ‘the economic theory of regulation’ (Posner, 1974) and others ‘the 
Chicago theory of government’ (Noll, 1989a). Stigler’s central proposition was that ‘as a rule, 
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit’. 
The benefits of regulation for an industry are obvious. The government can grant exemption   23 
from antitrust legislation, grant subsidies or ban the entry of competitors directly so that the 
level of prices rise. The government can maintain minimum prices and restrict entry more 
easily than a cartel. The government can suppress the use of substitutes and support 
complements. An example of each is the suppression of transport by trucking to protect the 
railroads and the subsidization of airports for the benefit of airlines. On the one hand, 
therefore a demand will arise for government regulation. The political decision-making 
process on the other hand makes it possible for industries to exploit politics for its own ends. 
For this proposition, Stigler uses the insights of Downs (1957) and Olson (1965). In the 
political process, primarily interest groups will exercise political influence, as opposed to 
individuals. Individuals will not participate because forming an opinion about political 
questions is expensive in terms of time, energy and money, while the benefits in terms of 
political influence will be negligible. Individuals will only be informed on particular interests 
as member of an interest group. Democracies will thus mostly be a platform for interest 
groups. Some groups can organize themselves less expensively than others. Small groups 
have the advantage because the transaction costs are lower and the ‘free-rider’ problem is 
smaller than is the case with large groups. Furthermore, in small groups the preferences will 
be more homogeneous than in large groups. Small groups also have the advantage in that for 
the same expected total revenue, the revenue per member of the group is greater. The fact that 
apparently large groups can still be well organized is explained by Stigler through 
concentration and asymmetry (Stigler, 1974). The large companies in a concentrated branch 
will see themselves as a small group. In the case of asymmetry in the industry , for example as 
a result of product diversity or widely varying production techniques, separate companies will 
wish to prevent unfavorable regulation and will participate in the organization. Stigler’s 

















Figure 5: Interest group representation depends on costs and benefits  
   24 
The figure illustrates how the amount of interest group action depends on the distribution of 
costs and benefits for the interest groups. Interest group A both has lower costs of 
organization and mobilization of its members, for example because it is a comparatively small 
group, and higher benefits. Interest group B has comparatively lower benefits, for example 
because they have to be shared among more members.  
 
The result of variation in the costs of organization is that producers organize more readily 
than consumers. Not only are the costs more modest for producers, but also the cost of 
regulation will be spread over more consumers so that the higher price per consumer is too 
small to justify organization. Politicians aim for re-election. Organized branches can 
contribute to re-election in two ways: by supplying votes and other resources. Examples of 
these resources are campaign contributions, chairing fundraising committees and the offer of 
employment to party members. The larger industries have an advantage in this over smaller 
branches, unless the smaller branches have something in their favor such as a strong 
geographical concentration. Politicians will honor the demand for regulation by industries 
because the opponents do not find it worthwhile to gather the information and organize. The 
conclusion is that regulation is not directed at the correction of market failures, but at 
effecting wealth transfers in favor of the industries in exchange for political support. 
Particularly the more competitive industries (professions, taxis, agriculture, trucking) will be 
favored: they have much to gain from regulation and are comparatively easily to organize. 
 
 




In the same issue of the Bell Journal of Economics in which Stigler put forward his theory of 
economic regulation, Posner (1971) implicitly supplied the first criticism. He observed that in 
many cases regulation strongly benefited certain consumer groups. For instance, uniform 
prices were prescribed for such things as rail transport, the supply of gas, water and 
electricity, telecommunications traffic and mail distribution. But the costs of supplying these 
services differ considerably, for example between residential and rural areas. Rural customers 
are more costly to serve network services than urban consumers. Other examples are the 
supply of drinking water to households, schools and fire services, either free of charge or at a 
price lower than the marginal costs; free rail travel for government workers and military 
personnel; the supply of electricity to hospitals at less than marginal costs and so on. This 
phenomenon of internal or cross-subsidization does not fit in well with Stigler’s theory of 
regulation. Even if other consumer groups are obliged to pay higher than marginal costs for 
their goods and services, cross-subsidization works against the aim of profit maximization. 
An explanation of cross-subsidization is provided in an extension to the theory of regulation 
by Peltzman (1976). He assumes that politicians will choose their policy of regulation such 
that political support is maximized. It is not likely that regulation will benefit industry 
exclusively. Some consumer groups will also be able to organize themselves effectively. 
Moreover, industry organization and information costs are an obstacle to the immediate and 
total withdrawal of political support in the event of a small decrease in the cartel profit. Lower 
prices benefit consumers, higher prices generate more political support from industry. 
According to Peltzman, the core problem for regulators is efficient regulation: what price 
level should be settled such that the gain in votes resulting from the wealth transfer just 
balances the loss of votes resulting from the rise in prices. Figure 5 illustrates his theory. The 
right panel depicts costs and revenues for the dominant firm. Marginal cost are assumed to be   25 
constant and equal to average cost. The demand schedule is decreasing and marginal revenue 
declines twice as steeply as average revenue because setting a lower price for additional units 
implies lower prices for intra marginal units as well. The welfare maximizing price is equal to 
Pc, where resource cost MC are equal to P. Profit maximization for the firm however, is where 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. This is at price Pm and units Qm. In the left panel, we 
find the turned over profit hill with zero profits at the consumer welfare maximizing price Pc 
and highest profits at the point where the firm maximizes its profits, Pm. If the firm would 
charge an even higher price, the revenue losses from decreasing quantities would be higher 
than the revenue increases from higher prices. Two iso-majority curves have also been drawn, 
reflecting combinations of profits and prices that render equal votes for the regulator. The 
further the M-curves are to the south-west, the higher the political support is for the regulator. 
The M-curves show that successive increases in Pc require increasingly higher profits to hold 
votes constant. A vote-maximizing regulator will therefore raise prices only to the point 
where votes gained from the firm by raising price is exactly offset by votes lost from 
consumers by the higher price. Unlike Stigler suggested, a regulator will not maximize profits 
for the firm. Rather, the political equilibrium will be at the efficient price Pe, where it is no 
longer possible to raise political support by raising price for the firm. The efficient price is at 
the point somewhere between the profit maximizing price and the welfare maximizing price 
where votes lost by raising price is exactly offset by the votes won by raising price. 
 













This extended theory explains not only the phenomenon of cross-subsidization, but it also 
predicts which industries will be regulated. These are the relatively competitive branches and 
the monopolistic branches. In the first case, these branches have a keen interest in regulation 
and, in the second case, consumers or particular consumer groups have a an interest in 
regulation. Intermediate industries or their customers have only a limited interest in 
regulation: regulated prices will not differ that much from the market outcomes. Regulatory 
practices appear to confirm this prediction. Regulated industries are either monopolistic, such   26 
as rail transport and telecommunications, or highly competitive, such as freight, agriculture, 
independent professions and cab companies. 
 
As well as the types of industries, the theory of regulation also predicts the form the benefits 
will take. In principle, transfers can be effected directly through subsidies or indirectly 
through price or quantity regulation or restriction to market entry. Stigler originally assumed 
that regulated industries would favor indirect support. The granting of subsidies would invite 
entry, so that the per-producer-subsidy would be dissipated. In an extension to the theory of 
regulation, Migué (1977) has shown that the form of the transfers is partly dependent on the 
supply elasticity of the production factors in the industry concerned. In the political market, 
the public are both consumers and suppliers of production factors. Suppliers of production 
factors will prefer subsidies when supply is inelastic. The taxation necessitated by the subsidy 
is distributed over many taxpayers, while the subsidy accrues to a limited group of suppliers 
of production factors. This extension to the theory of regulation explains why subsidies are 
granted in sectors such as education, health care, domestic housing and city transport, and 
why quota systems and price regulation can be found in sectors such as agriculture, airlines, 
road transport and railways. Similar reasoning explains why polluting companies prefer 
emission standards (quotas) above taxation (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975).  
 
Another extension to the theory of regulation is from McChesney (1987, 1991, 1997). He sees 
politicians not as neutral agents between competing private interests directed to obtaining 
transfers of income. In his view, politicians also try to benefit by putting private parties under 
pressure. He gives examples in which Congress, under the threat of price reductions or cost 
increases, forces concessions from private parties. To make such rent extractions possible, 
politicians encourage private parties to organize. Organization not only enhances the 
probability of gaining wealth transfers, it also increases the risk of having one’s own surplus 
threatened and expropriated. Finally, Keeler (1984) has supplemented Peltzman’s model with 
public interest considerations. In his model, politicians gain not only political support through 
the transfers of income or wealth between interest groups. An increase in economic 
efficiency, for example by promoting economies of scale and internalizing external effects, 
increases resources or welfare which can be distributed among producers and consumers. 




A further contribution to the Chicago theory of regulation was made by Becker (1983, 1985a, 
1985b). He concentrated on the effects of the competition between interest groups, which he 
calls pressure groups. As the political pressure increases, political influence also increases and 
the financial returns from the exerted pressure rises. Some groups are more efficient in 
exercising political pressure than others, perhaps as a result of economies of scale in the 
production of pressure, better abilities to counter free-riding, better access to the media, or in 
other ways. Wealth transfers thus take place from less efficient to more efficient groups 
through such instruments as price regulation or subsidies. A limit to these transfers exists, 
however. Wealth transfers are associated with economic losses, which are known as the 
deadweight costs. As a result of these losses the loss of the least efficient pressure group is 
greater than the gain to the more efficient pressure group. As the welfare losses become 
greater, the pressure of the more efficient group will decline because the returns of pressure 
are lower. At the same time, the pressure of the less efficient group increases with the 
increasing deadweight costs because its potential return on exercising pressure increases. This 
countervailing pressure limits the possibility of transfers to the more efficient pressure group.   27 
It can be deduced from this analysis that politically successful groups are small in proportion 
to the group bearing the burden of the transfers. The larger the burdened group, the smaller 
the levy per member of the group and the smaller the deadweight costs. This diminishes the 
countervailing pressure. The smaller the receiving group, the larger the potential return per 
member of the group, which serves to increase the pressure exerted. The analysis explains, for 
instance, why in countries where the agriculture sector is small it is subsidized, while large 
agriculture sectors elsewhere are heavily taxed. 
 
In Stigler’s and Peltzman’s view, competitive industries have much to gain from regulation 
and are in a better position than consumers to bring favorable regulation about. In practice, 
such regulation of competitive sectors is rarely seen. The explanation is found in Becker’s 
theory. Loss of welfare is greater where the elasticity of supply is greater. In competitive 
sectors,  the elasticity of supply is large. The transfers of income and the welfare losses 
associated with regulation are so large that the countervailing pressure invoked eliminates the 
investment in political influence. Becker’s analysis is illustrated in the following diagram of 
an organized industry.  
 
 













Imagine that regulation depends on the amount of expenditure spend on pressure and that 
firms have incurred sunk cost to organize. In a competitive sector, profits are zero and price is 
Pmc. If firms have organized, the profits could rise with the rectangle A, that is (Pm – MC) 
times Qm. That is the maximum amount firms would be willing to spend on obtaining 
favorable regulation. But the loss to consumers is the transfer to producers (rectangle A) plus 
the triangle B, that is consumers have more to lose and thus an incentive to spend more to 
prevent regulation. However, consumers also have to incur the costs of organization. Assume 
the cost of organization for consumers is given by the amount of rectangle C. Firms will now 
succeed in obtaining regulation if their expenditure is higher than the potential net gain for 
consumers to prevent regulation, that is the rectangle A plus the triangle B minus the 
rectangle C. This makes clear why regulation is less likely in the event of high deadweight   28 
losses: consumers have more to gain to prevent regulation. It also makes clear the importance 
of the size of the group: the larger the group, the higher the organization costs and the lower 
the amount per member to gain, recall that A and B are fixed amounts. 
 
It can be further deduced from the analysis that regulation is more likely in branches 
exhibiting market failures, a result in agreement with the public interest theory of regulation. 
In monopolistic industries, consumers may obtain larger transfers than the accompanying 
losses for producers. In competitive industries, on the other hand, the gain of the winners is 
smaller than the loss of the losers. All other things being equal, more pressure will be exerted 
in monopolistic industries by the potential winners and less pressure by the potential losers 
than in competitive industries. Market failure is therefore not a sufficient condition for 
regulation, such as in the public interest theory of regulation; regulation is also dependent on 
the relative efficiency of pressure groups in exerting political pressure. In contrast to Olson 
(1982), the competition between pressure groups will not have any negative effects on the 
growth of the national product and productivity, at least provided that pressure groups are of 
equal size and provided they are equally efficient in producing pressure. The competition 
between pressure groups will also lead to the most efficient form of regulation. 
 
Even if under certain circumstances the results of competition among pressure groups is 
efficient, Becker claims the production of pressure is not. All pressure groups would be better 
off if they decreased their expenditure on pressure by equal amounts. Various laws and rules 
directed to limiting the influence of pressure groups can be explained as instruments to limit 
wasteful expenditure on political pressure.  
 
The Chicago theory of regulation seems particularly suited to the explanation of so-called 
economic regulation. Social regulation, the regulation in the area of consumer protection, 
safety, environment and health, seems at first sight to be less amenable to explanation by this 
theory. There are diseconomies in the area of organization, the benefits are divided among 
many involved parties and the costs of regulation are allocated to concentrated groups. 
Nonetheless, private interest explanations have also been put forward to explain social 
regulation (see for example Bartel and Thomas, 1985, 1987; Pashigian, 1984a, 1984b; Sutter 
and Poitras, 2002; Tanguay et al, 2004). For example, the application of rules and standards, 
the dominant form in social regulation is in the interests of those companies already 
complying with the standard. Furthermore, benefited companies are also those producing 
inputs that are required by the standard. Also, large companies are benefitted when it is 
necessary to comply with administrative obligations or costly measures. Small companies are 
driven out of the market and the softening of competition may outweigh the increase in 
regulatory costs, depending on the elasticity of relevant variables (Bartel and Thomas, 1987). 
Legal requirements are above all often differentiated into existing producers and new 
producers. By setting higher standards on new producers, entry to the market is impeded and 
competition is restricted (Huber, 1983). A unified framework integrating several perspectives 
of the private interest theories of regulation has been devised by Beard, Kaserman and Mayo 
(2003; 2005). 
 
2.4 Criticism of the Private Interest Theories of Regulation 
 
The theory that regulation is explained as an efficient mechanism to redistribute wealth to the 
more efficient interest groups, has been criticized from different angles. First, the core of the 
private interest theories of regulation, that private interests translate into transfers in the 
political market, has been the object of criticism. Second, the hypothesis that regulation   29 
promotes mostly private interests, has been claimed to have been invalidated by empirical 
research. Contrary to this criticism, it has been argued that it is very difficult, if at all possible 
to test or refute the private interest theories of regulation. Third, it has been argued that the 
private interest theories are incomplete: political actors and an analysis of the interaction 
between the various actors in the regulation process is lacking from these theories. Finally, 
rent-seeking theorists criticize the efficiency assumptions of the Chicago theories of 
regulation. 
 
2.4.1 Transfer of wealth as the driving force of regulation 
 
With respect to the driving forces of regulation several weaknesses were identified in the 
literature. Noll (1989a) criticized the Chicago theories of running the risk of being a 
tautology. Regulation is always associated with redistribution of wealth. It involves costs and 
benefits for the different actors involved, such as the lobbying industries, consumer groups, 
bureaucrats, legislators, regulators, workers, taxpayers, and more. But by establishing who 
derives the benefits and who carries the cost, it has not been established that these costs and 
benefits actually drive regulation. Also, already at an early stage, Posner (1974) argued that a 
society concerned with the ability of interest groups to obtain favorable legislation, would 
establish institutions that promote the public interest. Many institutions and features of public 
policy, such as the independent judiciary or the constitutionally required payment of 
compensation in eminent domain cases, are more plausibly explained by a reference to a 
broad social interest in efficiency than by reference to the designs of narrow interest groups 
(p. 350). Related is another criticism. Private interest theories have shown to be weak in 
predicting which interest groups will actually be successful and who will receive the wealth 
transfer. For example, research has shown mainly workers derived the benefits from 
regulation, not producers (Bailey, 1986; Winston, 1993). This is an unexpected outcome not 
predicted by the private interest theories of regulation. Similarly, a review of the introduction 
or change of some twenty regulations by analyzing stock market data, showed no systematic 
tendency for increased wealth for the involved industries (Binder, 1985). A final puzzle is the 
inability of the private interest theories to predict which industries will actually be regulated. 
There are numerous branches of industry and all of them with more favorable characteristics 
to organize and obtain transfers compared to the organizational characteristics of consumers. 




2.4.2 Empirical validity and testing of private interest theories of regulation 
 
Private interest theories were mainly developed to explain the findings of ineffectiveness and 
inefficiencies of regulatory practices. The empirical research started with the seminal 
contribution by Stigler and Friedland (1962), who argued that regulation did not lower rates, 
nor reduced price discrimination, or significantly lowered profits. Ironically, this research 
later proved wrong about the magnitude of the effect of regulation (Peltzman, 1993), but it 
still generated a completely new perspective on the effects of government regulation. The 
analysis should have shown that regulation actually lowered price by about a fourth and 
thereby caused output to rise by over half. Other research also proved regulated prices to be 
significantly below the profit maximizing prices. For electricity these profit maximizing 
prices were estimated to be 20 to 50% higher than regulated actual prices ( Green and Smiley, 
1984). Furthermore, regulatory activity in the fields of the public utilities and in the fields of 
health, safety and the environment has come in waves of political activity (Peltzman, 1993).   30 
This is difficult to bring in accordance the static private interest theories of regulation. For an 
important subfield of regulation, occupational licensing, some and perhaps most of the 
evidence points to public interest explanations (Zerbe and Urban, 1988; Kleiner, 2000; to the 
contrary, for example Becker, 1986; Philipsen and Faure, 2002). See generally on how to 
obtain empirical results of the study of regulation and deregulation, Joskow, 2005. 
Contrary to the above argument, it has also been claimed that it is difficult, if at all possible to 
test the private interest theories of regulation (Potters and Sloof, 1996). In their encompassing 
review of empirical studies, the authors first note the importance of taking both demand and 
supply considerations into account for the explanation of public policy. The influence of an 
interest group depends also on the influences of other interest groups and on the importance of 
the constituency for the regulator. To determine the relative influence of an interest group it is 
therefore necessary to practically measure the constituent interests in a theoretical correct 
way. In the end the authors conclude that “it seems impossible to infer whether voters (the 
public at large), politicians, or special interest groups are the most influential” (p. 430). 
 
 
2.4.3 The incompleteness of the Chicago Theory of Regulation 
 
The Chicago theory of regulation assumes that interest groups determine the outcomes of 
elections, that legislators honor unimpaired the wishes of the interest groups and that 
legislators are able to control regulators. In these theories the following elements are 
conspicuously missing: 
a. the motivation and behavior of the various political actors, such as voters, congressmen, 
legislators, government workers and agencies; 
b. the interactions between the various actors in the regulation process; 
c. the mechanisms through which legislators and regulators serve the interests of the 
organized industries. 
In fact it is assumed that the operation of the political process of legislation and the 
administrative process of regulation has hardly any independent influence on the pattern and 
form of regulation, if at all. This assumption has been criticized from several quarters and 
several attempts have been made in the literature to fill in the three gaps.  
 
Public choice on regulation 
 
There is an obvious bordering field between regulation and public choice; overviews are 
given by Romer and Rosenthal (1987), Noll (1989a), Levine and Forrence (1990) and, 
specifically for the area of public choice, Mueller (1989, 2003), Frey (1978, 1983) and Frey 
and Ramser (1986). Particularly the interests of the involved bureaucracy or staff in 
regulatory systems has been studied: see Dunleavy (1991) and Wilson (1989). Studies of 
regulation thus evolve into theories of political action. 
The following figure adapted from Mitchell and Simmons (1994) illustrate some of the 
complexities in the political system, while not even taking into account impulses of other 
actors such as unions, courts, different layers of  parliament, or more. 
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Figure 8: Interaction in the political system  
 
The theory that only organized interests succeed in obtaining favorable legislation, has been 
criticized by Wilson (1974, 1980, 1989) among others. Not all legislation can be characterized 
by concentrated benefits and diffused costs. Majoritarian politics in Congress is to be 
expected when both costs and benefits are widely distributed; antimonopoly legislation is one 
example. Interest group politics arises if both cost and benefits are concentrated; labor 
legislation and railway regulation are examples of this. Client politics is the result of 
concentrated benefits and diffused costs; examples of this are the protection of professional 
groups by means of licensing and the subsidizing of companies and branches. A final 
characterization is entrepreneurial politics, in which the costs are concentrated and the 
benefits distributed; examples are protection of the environment, of consumers against unsafe 
products and of workers against industrial accidents and occupational illnesses. Particularly 
this last form of regulation is difficult to bring in line with the Chicago theories of regulation. 
The following figure illustrates Wilson’s distinctions (Wilson, 1980).  
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Figure 9: Types of governmental policies 
 
 
According to Wilson, interest groups are therefore not the only origin of regulation. Wilson 
also criticizes the assumption that legislators are able to fully control regulators. In his view, 
the behavior of the agencies is better understood by an analysis of the motivations of those 
involved internally. He distinguishes careerists, professionals and politicians and uses this to 
account for various types of regulation policy. Price regulation, for example, will be simple in 
structure if set up by careerists and more complex if it is developed by professionals and 
engineers.  
Contrary to Wilson, Derthick and Quirk (1985) assume that the regulation policy of agencies 
is actually heavily influenced by surrounding forces. They show that agencies honored diffuse 
interests at the expense of the concentrated interests of regulated industries, by deregulating 
certain industries. They explain these developments from the intellectual climate and the 
pressure exerted by the president, Congress and the courts on the agencies. In line with the 
Chicago theories of regulation, Weingast (1981) also sees no independent role for agencies. 
Changes in the regulatory policies of agencies are a consequence of changes in the 
preferences of Congress or its commissions. Contrary to Chicago, Weingast shows how a 
structure-induced equilibrium of policy choice arises as a reaction to the instability of 
majority rule voting. In an equilibrium of congressional committees, the agencies and the 
interest groups have divergent but comparable goals. Weingast’s model describes how 
political demands by interest groups are satisfied and how diffuse single-issue groups such as 
environmental groups and consumer organizations are able to acquire political power at the 
expense of traditional interest groups such as industry, employees and agriculture. 
The assumption that legislators are fully under the control of interest groups is particularly 
criticized from the perspective of the principal-agent theory. Information on the behavior of 
legislators and regulators is expensive. This creates room for legislators and regulators to 
escape the monitoring of voters and interest groups and to act in their own interests or 
according to ideological preferences (Kalt and Zupan, 1984, 1990). To explain differences 
between general and special interests and private and public interests, Levine and Forrence 
(1990) distinguish two types of motivation and two types of political dominance. Depending 
on what a political actor is aiming for, private and public interests can be distinguished. 
Private interests are preferences of political actors with respect to their self-interest. Public 
interests are preferences related to the interests of others. The private and public interests 
indicate what a political actor will maximize when there is room to aim for their own 
preferences. General-interest policy is a policy that should be ratified in the absence of 
information, organization, transaction and monitoring costs. Special-interest policies should 
not be ratified by the general polity in the absence of monitoring costs and so on. General 
interests and special interests refer to who and what dominates political decision-making. The 
following figure summarizes these distinctions (adapted from Levine and Forrence, 1990, p. 
184). 
 














Figure 10: Political dominance: general interests, special interests  
 
Monitoring cost result in ‘slack’ or policy drift, or in other words possibilities for the 
regulator to pursue its own objectives. On the one hand this discretion may be used to favor 
special interest groups, on the other hand, it can be used to promote the interests of others. 
Here again there are two possibilities. In the absence of monitoring and control costs, this 
policy slack would either be ratified by the general polity or not. The debate on the capture of 
regulators and legislators concerns the question who dominates the political process and is 
therefore less focused on private or public interests but rather on general and special interests. 
According to Levine and Forrence, general interests will prevail to the extent that slack is 
reduced. The amount of slack decreases drastically when issues enter the public agenda. 
Favorable conditions for this are: political competition, special interest organizations, public 
policy intelligentsia and the news media. A general-interest policy does not otherwise imply 
that the policy is also efficient. There is no guarantee that majority decisions are also welfare 
maximizing. When, for example, the rented sector is a substantial part of the housing market, 
a policy of rent control will achieve ready approval without any guarantee of efficiency. 
 
2.4.4 Normative rent-seeking analysis as positive theory 
 
A conceptually different type criticism of the Chicago theories of regulation comes from the 
Virginia School of Public Choice (Rowley, Tullock, Tollison, McCormick et al.). For an 
overview of this work, see Tullock (1993), Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980) and 
Rowley, Tollison and Tullock (1988). In their theories, the term coined by Ann Krueger 
(1974), rent-seeking, is a central feature. Rent-seeking means spending scarce resources on 
political action by individuals and groups to obtain monopoly rights or other favors granted 
by governments. The Virginia School criticizes the Chicago theoreticians for their disregard 
of the inefficiencies of regulation. Virginians evaluate institutions from the perspective of 
waste in the allocation of scarce resources. In this respect these theories are similar to the   34 
public interest theories of regulation. Where public interest theories consider regulation to be 
efficient, the rent-seeking theorists consider regulation to be inefficient. These theories can 
thus analogously be characterized as ‘normative rent-seeking analysis as positive theories’. In 
what has become a classic contribution, Tullock (1967) has shown that the inefficiencies of 
monopoly consist not only of the Harberger triangle, but also of what has come to be known 
as the Tullock rectangle. The possibility of rent-extraction invites investments by would-be 
monopolists to obtain favorable regulation. A monopolist is willing to spent at most the 
‘Tullock-rectangle’ to obtain favorable legislation, thereby dissipating the future rents. But 
also other would-be monopolist compete for this rent, wasting even more resources. 
Furthermore, the potentially disadvantaged consumers will spend scarce resources to prevent 
such a creation of a monopoly. And ex post, a monopolist will spend scarce resources to 
protect his monopoly rights against possible threats, from potential competitors and 
disadvantaged consumers. Finally, according to Hicks (1935, p. 8) the best of all monopoly is 
‘a quiet life’. This led Leibenstein to predict that the monopolist would be x-inefficient and 
not produce at minimal costs (Leibenstein, 1966; see, however, Stigler, 1976). Estimates of 
the profit rectangles and welfare triangles thus range from 7% to 50% of GNP; estimates of 
lobbying costs come on top of that, but are considered to be comparatively small. (Mueller, 
2003, p. 355).  
 
In Stigler’s and Peltzman’s view a non-contestable monopolist who has incurred substantial 
fixed costs has no incentive to obtain regulation since profits are already maximized. 
However, according to the Virginians, the incentives for regulation remain, though now from 
the side of bureaucracy and politics. The interests of bureaucrats and politicians can be served 
by giving certain consumer groups hidden privileges through cross-subsidies (Crew and 
Rowley, 1988). Furthermore, in the view of Chicago, redistributive instruments such as 
taxation, subsidies or regulation are equivalent either with respect to efficiency or to the 
precise nature of political equilibrium. The Virginians point, however, to the visibility of such 
taxes and subsidies, and the waste of scarce resources it provokes. Regulation gives more 
room to politicians and bureaucrats to put their own objectives into effect. Regulation and 
taxation differ also in terms of the inefficiencies they create. Traditionally, account is taken 
only of the welfare losses as measured by the Harberger triangle. Taxation has usually lower 
welfare losses than regulation, because it concerns a far larger group and the costs per person 
will be low. It is to be expected, however, that the Tullock rectangle inefficiencies will be 
larger if taxation is comparatively more transparent as a source for transfers than regulation.  
The following diagram illustrates the arguments of the rent-seeking theorists. Not only are 
firms willing to spend at most the expected increase in profits resulting from regulation 
(rectangle A), consumers will be willing to spend A + B to prevent regulation. Lobbying 
efforts will motivate bureaucrats and politicians to have a stake in the wealth transfer and the 
accompanying taxes will again motivate other interest groups to lobby for regulation of their 
own sector. Furthermore, employees in regulated sectors will also put in their efforts to obtain 
a part of the transfers. Finally, regulated sectors will be cost inefficient in several ways. The 
resources used for all these activities are considered to be a waste. These wasted resources can 
no longer be used for productive investments.  
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The rent-seeking theorems have been criticized for the overestimation of the assumed losses 
of welfare. It is not likely that monopolists are forced to use the entire Tullock rectangle in 
order to acquire their monopoly and, furthermore, rent-seeking outgoings have positive effects 
on welfare (Varian, 1989). A strong criticism is given by Samuels and Mercuro (1984), who 
judge that the limiting assumptions lead to misleading conclusions and that the normative 
analyses are too selective and limited to serve as a basis for policy. 
 
 
2.5 Institutional theories of regulation: independence and accountability 
 
The debates on who and what influences regulatory policy and the cost and benefits of 
regulatory capture have led to a number of theories on the design of regulatory institutions 
(Levi and Spiller, 1996). According to the public interest theories, a regulator pursues general 
interests policies, but private interest theories have shown regulators might be captured. There 
is a tradeoff between independence and accountability (Maskin and Tirole, 2004). On the one  
hand, to pursue general interest policies, sheltering regulators from the general polity can be 
desirable. Public utility services are important for the broader constituency and at the same 
time require a considerable amount of fixed investments. If regulators are dependent on short-
sighted politicians, they might not be able to resist the temptation to lower prices to marginal 
costs. Investors would foresee they would not be able to the cover costs of sunk investments 
and they would not invest. Independency of agencies is therefore desirable. Independent 
regulators might also be a source of innovation. Independency implies the possibility to 
experiment on new ways of monitoring and regulation. Independency will also motivate 
politicians to state the mission and task of the agency as clearly as possible. This makes it less 
likely or possible for the agency to pursue it’s own goals.  On the other hand, if regulators are 
no longer accountable to politicians, they might be captured and pursue special interests. The 
regulated firm might capture the agency: it has information, resources, employment 
opportunities and it can extract agency resources by for example litigating agency decisions. 
Furthermore, a regulator is usually independent with respect to a particular domain or sector.   36 
This limited domain makes spillover effects more likely to take place (Hahn, 2003). For 
example, mandating a safer and heavier car, increases polluting gasoline consumption and 
sulfur emissions from higher smokestacks end up as acid rain elsewhere. In the tradeoff 
between independency and accountability, several aspects of an ideal institutional design have 
been suggested and they depend for a part on the institutional environment in which the 
agency operates (Levi and Spiller, 1996; Martimort, 1999). Important variables in this regard 
are: the independency of the judiciary, the ability to commit to stated promises, the dispersion 
of powers among regulators or among the regulator and the government, the strength of the 
bureaucracy, the resources available to the agency, being elected or appointed, tenure for a 
longer or a shorter period, clearly stated mission and tasks, and more.  
 
 
3 Liberalization, Restructuring, and Re-Regulation 
 
3.1 Explanations of deregulation  
 
Once the Chicago theory of regulation had been developed, social developments seemed to 
refute it. While this theory explained regulation as aiming for transfers of income, at the end 
of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, many complexes of rules were dispensed with in 
a process of deregulation and privatization. This process of deregulation and privatization was 
mainly concerned with economic regulation of sectors such as transport (airlines and freight), 
telecommunications, energy and the financial sector. In the US, where these sectors were 
regulated, deregulation took place and in Europe, public enterprises were privatized. Social 
regulation increased even in scale, even though the nature of this regulation changed (more 
cost-benefit analyses, more risk analyses, more performance standards, fewer specification 
standards) (Winston and Crandall, 1994). For a description of this process of deregulation and 
(later) re-regulation see for example Bailey (1986), Hahn (1990) and Kahn (1990) for the 
USA, Vickers (1991) for the UK, Winston (1998) and Newberry (2001). The literature offers 
many reasons and explanations for these developments. Some examples are: the desire to 
foster efficiency and innovation; to decrease the extent of political intervention; to reduce 
government borrowing; to increase political popularity; to increase rewards paid to top 
management; to undermine trade-union power; to lower the level of cross-subsidies; to 
eliminate the inefficiencies caused by uninformed regulators or rent-extracting regulators. 
 
From the theories of regulation discussed above, various explanations can be derived for this 
process of deregulation and privatization (see Den Hertog, 1996; Peltzman, 1989; Keeler, 
1984). From the public interest theories of regulation two general explanations of 
deregulation can be derived. In the first place, it is possible that the cause of market failure is 
removed by technological or demand factors. Through increasing demand for, for example, 
transport facilities, a former natural monopoly may change into a competitive market. 
Furthermore, technological developments such as communication via satellite or through 
wireless facilities instead of by cable can undermine natural monopolies. A second 
explanation for deregulation may be the presence of more efficient alternatives to regulation 
to solve the market failure. New instruments may have been developed such as franchising or 
yardstick competition (Kay and Vickers, 1990). It is also possible that better insight exists 
into the envisaged and non-envisaged effects of regulations; see the literature mentioned 
above as well as Baldwin (1990), Stewart (1985), Wilson (1984) and Wolf (1979). Finally, it 
is possible that theoretical developments, such as, for example, contestable markets, inspire 
more confidence in the operation of the market mechanism (Bailey and Baumol, 1984).   37 
At least four causes of deregulation can be derived from the Chicago theory of regulation. In 
the first place, shifts can come about in the relative political power of pressure groups, for 
example, as a result of the more efficient combating of free-riding, the more efficient use of 
media or as a result of special entrepreneurship (Ralph Nader). In the second place, 
deregulation can arise when politically effective groups believe that they can better promote 
their economic interests in an unregulated market, for example by self regulation. In  
the third place, deregulation can be the result of declining profits, so that the political yield of 
regulation declines. The fixing of prices or the introduction of entry restrictions in sectors 
consisting of multiple companies, such as airlines or freight, will result in competition taking 
place in other dimensions of the product. Competition in the area of service, such as the 
frequency of transport, will result in a decline in profits. In Becker’s view, that leads to a 
decreased pressure from the branch involved and an increased pressure from consumers for 
price reduction. In Peltzman, politics will seek more fruitful regulation yields. Finally,  
deregulation can be accounted for by increasing deadweight costs. These costs increase in the 
course of time because substitutes for regulated products are developed and because costly 
methods of evading and avoiding particular regulations are discovered. The deregulation of 
sectors such as transport, telecommunications and banking, can then be seen as an echo of 
the regulation movement of the 1930s. Increasing deadweight costs are in the second place a 
result of the increasing marginal tax rates in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Becker, this 
stimulated the pressure on tax payers who were able to collect more political support than the 
groups who had the benefit of social security programs. 
 
According to theories of regulation that have evolved into theories of political action, 
deregulation can first of all be accounted for by a changed balance of power of pressure 
groups. In the second place, structure-induced equilibrium can be disturbed by the actions of 
political entrepreneurs, such as the chairpersons of regulatory commissions. In the third place, 
politicians can seek political support for deregulation by providing voters with information 
about the inefficiencies of regulation. Alternatively, politicians could try to use the 
complexities of regulatory issues by claiming that economic deregulation would greatly 
advance economic and social welfare. 
 
A general comparison of deregulation practice and the various theories gives a mixed picture 
(see Peltzman, 1989; Noll, 1989b). If the public interest theory were generally applicable, 
deregulation would have taken place sooner. On the other hand, events such as the 
deregulation of freight are once again difficult to account for with the Chicago theory: in this 
sector profit was being made and the employees also had much to lose from deregulation. 
Various circumstances including political entrepreneurship were considered to be applicable 
and have also played a role in practice. In other cases, Congress has played no role and the 
legislation was changed after deregulation was already a fact. Also the expectations with 
respect to the future development of regulation and deregulation are mixed. On the one hand 
there are researchers such as Kahn (1990) and Hahn (1990) who are convinced of the relative 
efficiency of the market mechanism and of regulation mechanisms that support and sustain 
the market. They see a greater role for government in the area of competition politics and in 
setting constraints to the functioning of markets, such as in the area of safety. On the other 
hand, there are voices, such as that of Cudahy (1993), who assumes that the process of 
deregulation will be followed in the downward phase of the business cycle by a phase of 
renewed regulation. Some alleged disadvantages of deregulation, such as predatory pricing, 
fluctuating prices and discriminatory prices, insufficient service, increased lack of safety, job 
insecurity and redundancy for large groups of employees will ring in a new age of regulation. 
Interestingly, and in line with these predictions new theories have been developed that explain   38 
regulation as well as deregulation from the comparative efficiency of private litigation versus 
public regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). Regulatory theories have thus come to a full 
circle from the naïve public interest theories and the private interest theories to comparative 
institutional regulatory theories that explain regulation from the perspective of being the 
comparatively most efficient institution in dealing with the transaction costs of the market. 
 
 
3.2 Restructuring, Competition and Re-Regulation 
 
3.2.1 Privatization and regulatory reform  
 
Natural monopoly activities have either been organized in public enterprises, as in most 
European countries or they have been regulated by regulatory authorities, as in the USA. 
When for several reasons, in European countries it was decided that public enterprises should 
be privatised, decision-makers of course realized that some form of regulating the former 
incumbent monopolist would be necessary, either for the inherently monopolistic parts or for 
as long as effective competition had not yet arisen. Price-cap regulation was developed for 
these formerly public enterprises, contrary to the US-method of ‘fair rate of return regulation’ 
of  the monopoly firms. Rate of return regulation or profit regulation of private monopoly 
companies had in the US been developed through a long historical process of court cases 
against regulatory intervention by government agencies. The outcome of this process was 
what some characterized as a ‘regulatory contract’ (Sidak and Spulber, 1998). Both the 
interests of the firm and the interest stated by regulatory agencies were honoured in this 
contract. For the regulated firms the result of these court cases implied that they should be 
able to maintain financial integrity, attract new capital and that the investors should be 
compensated adequately for the risks assumed. On the other hand, they should provide their 
goods and services on a ‘non-discriminatory’ basis and charge ‘just and reasonable’ prices 
(Kahn, 1988; Philips, 1969). Prices for different customer groups were decided and 
investments allowed in so-called rate cases, that could take place yearly if necessary, 
depending on whether or not cost or profits had risen. Regulatory agencies would in the first 
stage of such a case decide on the revenue requirement or cost or service. For this reason rate 
of return regulation is also called cost of service regulation. In the second stage the structure 
of prices for different markets and products (thus customer groups) is decided. The revenue 
requirement can be described by the following formulae: PQ = E + rB, where PQ is total 
revenue, E is expenditure, r the rate of return on capital investments, and B the rate base (or 
regulatory asset value or regulatory asset base). Regulators thus determine the revenues such 
that it is equal to the sum of operating expenditures (E: OPEX) and capital expenditures (rB: 
CAPEX), compare point (Pac,Qac) in figure 2. For a gas distribution company for example, the 
operating cost would consists of such elements as gas, labour, depreciation, taxes. The net 
operating income or cash flow would be the difference between the revenues from selling the 
gas through its network and the operating cost. That amount should be sufficient to cover the 
capital cost (CAPEX), a weighted average of the cost of equity (stocks) and debt (bonds). The 
rate of return for investors is then determined as the required net operating income as a 
percentage of the rate base (the value of the plant less depreciation). If investors would not 
receive sufficient returns on their investments (dividends), prices should go up and the net 
operating income (profits) should increase until the allowed rate of return is reached.  
 
This type of regulation can be analysed from different perspectives (How and Rasmussen, 
1982; Thompson, 1991; Posner, 1999). First, it is a comparatively stable form of regulation: 
just and reasonable prices are combined with a fair rate of return for investors which makes   39 
those involved committed to the outcomes (Newbery, 2001). Second, determining the rate 
level and rate structure by rate cases that are not unlike court procedures, is an 
administratively cumbersome process of regulation and requires many resources. Third, since 
regulators will not risk the firm to go bankrupt, they will sooner set the rate of return too high 
rather than too low. This leads to the so-called Averch-Johnson effect, a productive 
inefficiency because capital is effectively subsidized and which makes firms favour capital-
intensive production technologies. On the other, this might also contribute to dynamic 
efficiencies if these technologies embody innovations. Fourth, the operating expenditures E 
are considered to be primarily the responsibility of the firm’s managers. These costs 
sometimes amount to 70-85% of the firm’s total cost and are essentially ‘pass-through’ in 
consumer prices, although of course they must be ‘reasonable’. The fixed profit rate and the 
‘cost pass-through’ practice do not provide managers with incentives to be cost-efficient. Of 
course, the period in between two rate cases, the regulatory lag, offers the firm to make a 
profit by being more efficient at given regulated prices. However, the managers will also take 
into account that these efficiencies will be acknowledged by the regulators at the next rate 
case. For those reasons, some incentive mechanisms have been introduced in rate of return 
regulation (Trebing, 1968; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986; Mayer and Vickers, 1996). An 
example is the so-called ‘sliding scale regulation’, where firms are allowed to keep some of 
the extra profits they make by being more efficient. The actual rate of return would then be 
determined by the formulae  R
a
t =Rt + h(R
* - Rt), where R
* is the target rate of return, Rt the 
rate of return at initial prices and R
a
t the rate of return at the new prices, and h would be a 
‘sharing constant’ between zero and one. For example, if the target rate of return is 12% and 
firms are allowed to keep 50% of the extra profit they make (h is 0,5), and the actual rate of 
return at initial prices is 16% (Rt), then the actual rate of return (R
a
t) at the new prices would 
be 14%, sharing the extra profit of 4% between shareholders and consumers by lowering 
prices. The benefits are increased incentives to reduce costs, the sharing of profits and less 




Becoming more efficient was precisely one of the more important objectives of privatization 
of the public enterprises in Europe (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bishop, Kay and Mayer 
(eds.), 1995). If the privatization of public enterprises was to be a successful endeavour, 
investors had to be ascertained of the practice of regulation after privatization and they had to 
be convinced that investing in a formerly public enterprise would be profitable. To do so a 
new system of regulation was developed, originally based on the ideas of Professor Littlechild 
(Bartle, 2003; Beesley and Littlechild, 1989; Rees and Vickers, 1995). In the UK, legislation 
on privatized utilities system determines that regulation should be such that utilities ensure 
adequate quantity and quality of supply, that competition is promoted, that efficiency and 
economy is promoted and that interests of consumers are protected. To accomplish these 
goals, price-cap regulation was instituted (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1997). Utility 
prices were determined according to the formulae RPI – X, where RPI stands for the retail 
price-index and X for the productivity increases of the employed production factors. If for 
example inflation rises with 5% and productivity increases yearly with 3%, then regulated 
firms are allowed to maximally increase their prices according to the cost increase, which is 
2%. Procedurally, to regulate a firm, a financial model of the firm will be devised and 
consultation documents published on the internet so that interested parties can react. After this 
period of consultation the regulator decides, among others, on the price-caps which are either 
accepted by the regulated firm or contested by appealing to the courts. The entire procedure 
takes about one to two years, but the decisions on the price formulae and thus the X-factor   40 
will remain in place for about five years. This means that, if a firm succeeds in lowering its 
costs more than the productivity increases reflected by the X-factor, its profits will rise 
equivalently at given prices. Schematically, the X-factor is determined as follows (adapted 
from Baldwin and Cave, 1999, pp. 229-231): 
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Figure 12: Price-Cap Regulation or how to determine X  
 
The X-factor determined at the price-review thus reflects the unanticipated efficiency savings 
of the past, forecasted efficiency savings, desired quality improvements, a desirable 
‘glidepath’ adapting prices to costs, and more. Price-cap regulation differs in the following 
ways from rate of return regulation (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989; Newbery, 1998; 
Sappington and Weisman, 1996; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996; Baron, 1995, Vogelsang, 
2002). Unlike rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation is particularly focused on 
motivating managerial efforts and investments in decreasing operating costs. For this reason it 
is also called incentive regulation. Also, price-cap regulation proceeds from projected 
efficient cost. Regulators determine these projected costs on the basis of efficiency studies, 
comparative analysis with other firms (yardstick competition, see below) or from general 
productivity trends. Because price-cap regulation is only applied to the monopoly part of the 
firm and not to the competitive parts, where competition is expected to discipline the firm, 
this type of regulation is administratively less cumbersome compared to rate of return 
regulation. The price-cap furthermore concerns a ‘basket’ of prices which means that the 
structure of prices is for the most part determined by the managers of the firm. They will set 
prices to maximize profits which often also contributes to efficiency. Also, regulators have 
more flexibility and discretion compared to US-regulators: there are more degrees of freedom 
in setting X than in determining the rate of return. Finally, the length of time between the 
formal price reviews is four to five years, unlike rate of return regulation where rate cases 
might take place each year, for example in times of inflation. This could mean that firms earn 
excess profits for a period of up to five years. 
 
There are also a number of obvious drawbacks from this type of incentive regulation. If it is 
difficult to observe quality, and quality requires spending resources, the firm may be 
motivated to decrease costs by decreasing quality, thus improving its profits (Elliot, 2006; 
Sappington, 2005). The firm might thus invest less in maintenance, reliability, frequency, and 
the like. In practice, regulators have sometimes included an extra factor in the formulae to   41 
motivate the managers to reach certain quality levels. Prices are allowed to increase more 
when those levels have been reached. Also, the regulator will gradually come to learn the 
firm’s realized costs. It may be tempting for regulators not to proceed from projected efficient 
cost, but from what they have learned the firm can accomplish. But if they do so, the firm will 
anticipate this and will not be motivated or behave strategically in putting effort to minimize 
costs. At the end of the regulation period, the managers for example will postpone 
investments in efficiency. Of course, regulators should also be committed not ‘to claw back’ 
any excess profits the firm has acquired by maximizing the difference between its revenues 
and costs. Again, if they do, they would undermine the motivation of the firm’s managers to 
maximize profits and decrease costs. Finally, price-cap regulation is best suited as an 
incentive regulation to promote the cost efficiency of firms. But if the primary goal is to have 
more investments, for example to renew the sewerage network or to install a fibre optics 
network, is not obvious that price regulation is the best instrument to deal with such issues. 
Investments are more commonly thought to be motivated by profits rather than by prices.  
 
The comparison makes clear that price-cap regulation and rate of return regulation are 
actually two polar forms of regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Newbery, 1998; Cowan, 
2006; Joskow, 2008). Regulators trade off the objectives of cost efficiency and profit 
extraction. The regulator does not know the firm’s cost and its potential, nor is the level and 
composition of the firm’s demand fully known by the regulator. The regulator thus faces a 
dilemma: it can take away all the firm’s profit but then the managers have no incentive to 
reduce the operating cost. And furthermore, in order to induce the firm to produce, it has to 
set a high allowable revenue anyway. But to motivate efforts in cost efficiency, the regulator 
also needs to let the firm keep some of its profits. Regulators have tried to escape this 
dilemma by narrowing their information disadvantages. For example they have used 
benchmarking, yardstick competition and bidding processes to become better informed about 
the cost opportunities the firm actually has (sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). There appears to be a 
general economic problem of regulation (Newbery, 1998). The regulator has to determine the 
allowable revenue for the firm. This can specified as P = bP
i + (1-b)C, where P
i is a price 
independent of the firm’s average cost, C. If  b is zero, the allowable price or revenue is equal 
to the firm’s cost, which compares to rate of return regulation. The firm is thus allowed to 
cover its cost but no more and it has no incentives to reduce its costs. If b is 1, the formulae 
reduces to the allowed price being equal to a fixed price, which corresponds to price-cap 
regulation. The firm is allowed to keep all of its profits. The term b is the incentive ‘power’ of 
the regulatory scheme, it is at its highest if b = 1. For example, assume the firm’s unit cost are 
€10. The regulator sets the incentive power to zero and let the allowable revenue to be only 
equal to the firm’s cost of €10. Alternatively, the regulator could set the incentive power term 
at for example 0,7. Let us assume that initially the average cost are equal to the projected 
efficient cost, P
i. At the efficient cost of €10, the firm can still recover its costs because the 
allowable revenue is also €10 = (0,7.10 + 0,3.10). However, let us now assume that the firm 
can reduce its costs by better operating procedures to €9 per unit. The projected efficient cost 
are still €10 but the actual costs to the firm have decreased to €9. Allowable revenue for the 
firm now falls to €9.70 =  (0,7.10) + (0,3.9). The firm is rewarded for its managerial efforts to 
reduce its cost by an additional profit of €0.70 per unit. The consumer benefit of these efforts 
is €0.30. Of course, given the objectives of the regulator to extract profit and to minimize 
cost, such a scheme is only efficient if these cost reductions are truly the result of managerial 
effort and not the result of some exogenous decrease in input prices (see generally Lyon, 
1996; Mayer and Vickers, 1996; Hawdon et al., 2007).  
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3.2.2 Competition among networks 
 
It was already mentioned that the privatization and regulatory reform of public enterprises 
embodied the perspective of introducing competition in these public utilities and transport 
sectors. From a public interest perspective the literature offers at least five arguments why 
deregulation and the introduction of competition might be desirable, despite the fact that the 
industries involved are characterized by decreasing cost per unit supplied (Joskow, 1996; 
Economides 2004; Klein, 1999; Newbery, 2004). Firstly, competitive pressures will force the 
incumbent firm to lower the x-inefficiencies it incurred during the process of regulation. The 
resulting cost decreases may be such that lower market prices will result, despite the inherent 
tendency of unit cost to increase that result from the entry of one or more firms in the ‘natural 
monopoly’ market. Secondly, inefficiencies resulting from rent-seeking by the firm or 
inefficiencies resulting from uninformed or rent-extracting regulators will decrease. Thirdly, 
since regulated firms are often also active in adjacent but unregulated markets, the 
introduction of competition will make it more difficult for such a firm to pursue predatory or 
cost raising strategies towards rivals. Fourthly, if the industry is being restructured 
(separated), the firm operating the network will have an incentive to profitably increase the 
capacity and quality of the network, in stead of artificially cutting back on capacity to keep 
out rivals in downstream markets. And finally, depending on the possibility of horizontal 
(regional) restructuring, the introduction of competitive pressures by means of yardstick 
competition will become possible.  
 
However, whether or not these benefits will actually materialize, crucially depends on the 
appropriateness of the governance structure in relation to the particular industry or country 
characteristics involved (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006; Parker, 1999; Levy and Spiller, 
1996; Kessides, 2004; Crocker and Masten, 1996). As mentioned earlier, the industries 
involved may be characterized as network sectors. They are usually integrated sectors of 
production, distribution and retail, where the distributional part has network characteristics 
(pipes, wires, railways, runways, etc.). Ideally, if market demand would be such that several 
networks could be supported or that several substitutes would be available, the benefits of 
competition could materialize, given sufficient general antitrust enforcement. More likely, 
these networks will be of different size, which would then require access regulation to 
interconnect them. For example, in the market for telecommunication usually several 
networks are available to provide telecommunication services (telephone, internet, television 
signals). Differences in size may also require asymmetric regulation, for example by 
obligating only the former monopolist with the provision of universal services (Armstrong, 
2001; Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002). Difficult trade-offs would have to be taken into account 
by sector regulators, for example stimulating competition in the take-off stage of competition 
by easy access requirements, and later on gradually leveling the playing field when more 
mature stages of competition have developed. But even the existence of several networks or 
substitutes does not a guarantee effective competition to take place. Switching costs may 
effectively lock-in customers to existing suppliers, preventing them to change suppliers even 
if it would be efficient to do so (Farrell and Klemperer, 2006; Gans and King, 2000; 
Waterson, 2003). Again, complex regulatory trade-offs are involved, since regulations to 
lower switching costs may actually increase entry costs and market prices. 
 
3.2.3 Competition for the market: franchise bidding as an alternative to regulation 
 
In several instances market demand or technological characteristics are such that competition 
between networks or substitute products is unavailable. Possible alternatives to competition   43 
on the market are then competition for the market or the use of yardstick competition. The 
alternative of competition for the market was discussed as early as the seventies (Demsetz, 
1968) and has since then also been put into practice in such fields as cable television, railway 
passenger services, local bus transport services, the water industry, the postal sector and 
highways (Cambini and Filipini, 2004; Otsuka, 1997, Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Littlechild, 
2002). The essential idea is to organize a bidding process to allocate an exclusive right (the 
franchise) to carry out certain activities (broadcasting television or radio signals, delivery of 
local bus passenger services, operate a distribution network). The benefits, compared with the 
traditional rate of return regulation are obvious. The government no longer needs information 
on costs and demand to achieve optimal pricing, a regulatory agency need not be established 
and the cost inefficiencies resulting from regulation are not present. The most cost efficient 
firm is automatically selected in the bidding process. However, as soon as the bidding process 
is not solely on price but also on quality, matters become more complicated. Although 
bidding on items with multiple dimensions is possible, a number of the benefits of the simple 
price bidding schemes disappear. Not only is the transparency of the bidding process often 
diminished, resulting in for example more court cases, but also the enforcement of the 
franchise contract becomes costly. Quality dimensions (frequency, reliability, security, etc.) 
are not easily observed and have to be defined, measured and monitored. This requires an 
ongoing monitoring institution. Rent-seeking efforts will increase with the increasing 
responsibilities of the franchising agency. Furthermore, difficult trade-offs with respect the 
duration of the contract have to be made. Short-term contracts encourages compliance with 
the terms of the contract, but discourages incentives to invest. And long-term contracts, which 
seem appropriate in the case of network investments, must allow for changes in demand and 
cost conditions. Not only are such contracts difficult to write, but they also require continued 
monitoring and they bring with them options to behave opportunistically for both the 
franchisee and the franchisor. And finally, competition requires a sufficient number of 
applicants wanting to obtain the franchise agreement. However, the incumbent franchisee has 
a number of advantages that are difficult to overcome for rivals. Not only is she better 
informed about the market, the franchise process and the franchising agency, the agency itself 
might prefer to continue to do business with the incumbent franchisee. There’s always a risk 
in changing the status quo and possible lost benefits of an alternative provider do not have a 
‘residual owner’ who could protest against conservative decisions. In practice the incumbent 
often wins again at re-franchising (Nash and Smith, 2006; Dalen, Moen and Riis, 2006; 
Zupan, 1989).  
 
 
3.2.4 Vertical separation, horizontal separation and yardstick competition 
 
One possible way to diminish complexities arising from the desire to franchise integrated 
public utilities, is to separate different functions of the integrated utility. Different stages in 
the provision of goods and services can be distinguished such as for example production, 
distribution and retail, or building, operating, and transfer of the infrastructure. Identifying 
benefits and costs of vertical or functional separation is a contentious issue in the literature 
(Shelanski and Sidak, 2001; Sappington, 2006; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1996, Newbery, 2002). 
Vertically separating the industry would appear to have a number of advantages, both with 
respect to franchising, but also with respect to regulation. First, if competition among multiple 
networks is unavailable, it would allow the identification of parts of the industry to be 
subjected to regulation or to franchising. In other stages competition would increase. Second, 
it would make the franchise contract less complicated which, ceteris paribus would increase 
the number of applicants. And third, if the network was the bottle neck facility and if that part   44 
was to be separated from the production and marketing stages, the incumbent firm would no 
longer be in the position to strategically abuse its ownership of the network by practicing 
anticompetitive strategies such as price squeezes, raising rival’s costs strategies, etc. 
Separation also has a number of disadvantages. Coordination between activities in different 
stages now has to take place by means of contract in stead of by means of internal managerial 
command and control methods. These contracts are difficult to write and enforce. If trains are 
delayed, is this because of the maintenance of the network or because the train operator 
performed inadequately? Economies of scale and scope of integration will be lost. The 
increase in the risk for companies using the network, will be reflected in fewer participants in 
the franchise auction and in higher bidding prices. Separation will also diminish incentives to 
invest if operating costs increase or if not all revenues from these investments can be 
appropriated. Furthermore, if the integrated firm no longer is allowed to enter adjacent or 
downstream markets, competition in those markets will diminish. Finally, vertical separation 
may give rise to the double marginalization problem. The fundamental trade-off with respect 
to vertical separation thus concerns the benefits of competition versus the investments and 
coordination benefits of integration. 
 
In some industries, such as the water industry it is for technical reasons not possible to 
vertically separate the industry in for example a competitive production stage and a 
monopolist distribution stage. However, such and other industries (electricity, passenger 
services) are usually organized regionally, which opens up the possibility of introducing 
rivalry by means of benchmarking or yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985; Sobel, 1999; 
Yatchew, 2001; Cowan, 1997; Parker et al., 2006)). If the industry originally was organized 
nationally, horizontal (regional) separation would be a logical way to introduce this form of 
competition. The essential idea is to compare the average cost of firms in different regions 
and correct those cost for individual factors influencing these average costs (population 
density, ratio of business versus residential customers, environmental factors, etc.). The 
regulator will then set the price of a firm’s product in a particular region equal to the average 
costs of all firms, excluding the average costs of this particular firm. If the regulated firm now 
reduces its own costs, its profits will increase. If prices for all private but regulated firms were 
set in this way, this would motivate all firms to be as cost efficient as possible. Cost 
inefficient firms would be penalized by making losses.  
 
However, this system also suffers from a number of drawbacks. First, it is difficult to find 
comparable firms, because market conditions differ and because of differences in past 
investments. Second, a sufficient number of firms must be available to make such a 
comparison. Extending the horizontal separation of the industry too far will result in 
diseconomies of scale and scope. Third, there is the danger of collusion among the managers 
of the firms to maintain high cost levels. For those and other reasons, another regulatory 
strategy has sometimes been to keep firms integrated but to demand access to their essential 
facilities and to demand interconnection with alternative or rival networks. 
 
 
3.2.5 Vertical integration and access regulation  
 
An alternative to structural separation of the industry is the introduction of competition by 
means of liberalization of the industry and the introduction of access regulation. It has been 
suggested that the most distinctive development in the regulation of telecommunication is the 
shift from rate regulation to access regulation (Spulber and Yoo, 2005; Tardiff, 2006). 
Different forms of access to a network can be distinguished such as for example retail access,   45 
interconnection access, unbundled access, and wholesale access. Retail access is provided to 
final customers and concerns the right of end users to obtain the services provided by a 
network. Often these services are provided at regulated ‘reasonable’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ 
retail rates. Interconnection access refers to connections between competing networks 
providing access to each other’s facilities. Interconnection is necessary to ensure that a 
customer on network A is able to communicate with a customer on network B. Unbundled 
access refers to possibility of competitors to use connections in the incumbent’s central 
offices so that it can directly connect to the customer’s premises. Wholesale access involves 
providing access to a competitor in order to provide wholesale services. The access could be 
negotiated and contracted by the incumbent monopolist or could be mandated by the 
regulator. You can think of services such as metering and billing, customer premises 
equipment, internet and data, and more. Liberalization makes entry of competitors possible 
who either own and operate their own network or supply services over the existing networks. 
For example, internet service providers may provide access to the internet using the network 
of the incumbent telecommunication company. On the one hand, by not separating the 
incumbent firm, important economies of scale and scope can be maintained. On the other 
hand, several types of costs are involved when competition is introduced by means of access 
regulation (Spulber and Yoo, 2005). It requires the incumbent firm to transact with 
competitors and thus to make transaction costs. It may involuntarily have to increase its 
capacity. Due to adjusting its network capacity, it may have to reconfigure its network and all 
these changes require making adjustments costs. Furthermore, as a result of mandating access, 
bottlenecks in using the network and congestion costs may appear. These effects mainly result 
because the incumbent firm is forced to expand its network and transact and contract beyond 
its voluntarily and optimally chosen organizational structure. Regulatory enforcement will 
also be costly. Since obviously firms will appeal the terms on which mandated access is 
negotiated with the incumbent, the telecom regulators will have to decide on difficult pricing 
issues (Vogelsang, 2003; Sarmento and Brandao, 2007; Laffont and Tirole, 2000).  
 
Digitalization of communication services and the replacement of copper cables by fiber optic 
networks will change market structures significantly. Telephone, television and internet 
services are now often provided over the same network, a phenomenon called ‘convergence’. 
Both cable companies and telecommunication companies will be able to offer these so-called 
‘triple play’ services. The prediction is that these future changes in market structures will 
imply fundamental changes for regulators (De Bijl and Peitz, 2008; De Bijl, 2008; Cave, 
2006). Where originally the expectation was that effective competition would take place 
through several competing networks, and that regulators could withdraw from this market, it 
is now seriously considered that new technologies will drive the market towards a new natural 
fiber optics monopolist. Should such a network be separated from competitive upstream and 
downstream markets, should governments take the lead in developing these networks, and if 
commercial parties operate the network, how should they be regulated, these are just some of 
the questions that will need to be answered in the near future. 
 
4 Concluding comments 
 
The past two decades, regulators have been very successful in lowering the operating 
expenditures of the regulated firms. However, it has been noted that massive investments will 
be needed in the regulated sectors in the near future (WRR, 2008). Huge investments are 
needed to meet future energy demands, to replace ageing sewerage systems and power 
networks, to protect against climate change (floods), to reduce or store carbon-dioxide 
emissions, to modernize congested transport systems, to finance renewal of electronic   46 
communication systems (fiber optics), and more. The question arises if current regulatory 
institutions and practices are up to those challenges. Can we expect regulatory instruments 
focused primarily on motivating managers to lower operating expenditures to be just as 
successful in motivating firms to undertake vast sums of uncertain, irreversible, long-lived 
and innovative investments? Can we expect this to happen, where: 
- regulators in the past have allowed only ‘prudently’ incurred investment to receive a fair rate 
of return;  
- where regulated firms were left with ‘stranded’ assets after the introduction of competition; 
- where regulated firms were forced to compete with a hypothetical efficient firm in an 
optimally configured network that obviously was not stuck with past investments;  
- where investments are long-lived, but regulatory reviews are taking place every five years;  
- where construction time tends to be large, demand uncertain so that the investments may not 
cover their costs and recoupment may not be allowed since investments must be ‘used and 
useful’; 
- where excess profits, the driving force of most investments, above the allowed rate of return 
are taxed away at the next regulatory review by raising the X-factor or by requiring higher 
quality levels of services provided; and, 
- where regulators have the statutory duty to promote the interest of consumers and returns on 
investments earned on the regulated company’s assets are up to one third of the total price 
paid by consumers? 
And even more profound questions are if regulatory authorities are the best placed institutions 
to evaluate business investments programmes and to tradeoff conflicting interests between 
those involved, such as consumers and investors. It would seem that legislators and regulators 
will be facing fundamental challenges and changes in the coming years. 
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